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“And wait patiently for the judgment of your Lord, for surely you are before Our eyes, and 
celebrate the praise of your Lord when you rise” (52:48) 
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ABSTRACT  
 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the differences in perceptions towards corporate 
governance practices on the boards of joint ventures between international or domestic private 
firms and Egyptian state-owned companies using the oil and gas industry as a case study. A 
questionnaire was distributed to 13 oil and gas joint venture companies where 100 board 
members completed the survey. The study reveals the barriers hindering board effectiveness 
between the domestic and international board members.  The differences towards governance 
practices do exist between local- Egyptian board members who represent the state as an owner, 
Egyptians representing the private partner, and foreign board members or joint venture boards. 
The results of the questionnaire shows that nearly half of foreign board members are not satisfied 
with the board composition and the capabilities of the directors which are considered an 
important factor in achieving board effectiveness.  Nearly half of the Egyptian board members 
representing the private partner support the view that that the board is not allowed having an 
access to information in the right time, in contrast to the views of their foreign counterpart. In 
addition, there is a need for board members to dedicate more time to strategy, performance, 
talent, and risk management. Nearly half of the foreign board members support the bringing of 
independent directors into their boards. As for the agenda and materials preparation given to 
board, almost half of the foreign board members see the need for improving the preparation of 
board meeting materials and for actively engaging in discussions during the meetings to achieve 
board efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, SOEs, local and foreign Board members, Oil and Gas joint 
ventures, Egypt.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
Enhancing Board effectiveness is considered a fundamental instrument and one of the 
centerpieces of corporate governance in any enterprise (Menozzi et.al, 2010; Aguilera, 2005; 
IFC, 2010; OECD, 2007).  
However, the hefty differences that separate corporate governance‘s national models cause 
foreign board members to reach divergent conclusions as to the way, the practices and issues of 
corporate governance – related to improving the board effectiveness  -  should be tackled and 
followed if compared to their local counterparts (EU Corporate Governance Framework, 2011). 
This leads to major differences resulting in higher management complexity and conflicts in a 
Joint Venture (JV, hereafter) (Bogun, 2008) and consequently lead to a no-win governance 
situation and to the formation of a confused board which therefore results in a confused company 
(Ward 2000). According to Bogun (2008), research has confirmed the inner workings of an IJV 
board are considered challenging if they are compared to those of an unitary firm, mainly 
because of continuing active cooperation established between two or more partner firms 
(Oseichuk et al., 2009). What weakens the performance of the board of directors are cultural 
differences pertaining to practices, values, and ethics, dissimilar motivations, restricted 
communication, the pressures and expectations of parent firms, higher need to create personal 
connections with the other side, many calls for resources, vague and intricate network borders, 
and unclear information flow(Hofstede, 1980; Salk and Shenkar, 2001).  
It was found that those firms that are monitored, controlled, and governed according to 
international best practices tended to be more successful in terms of profitability and growth 
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(Oseichuk et al., 2009). Conversely, it was also noticed that those enterprises lacking in proper 
corporate governance practices are more susceptible to poor performance, leakage, and 
insolvency (Oseichuk et al., 2009).  
Corporate governance encompasses transparency and ensures that the board, who are 
considered the representatives of the owners of the organization, are guarding resources as well 
as allocating them to make planned progress towards the defined targets of the organization.   
Corporate governance also focuses on the issue that board is held appropriately to account by 
stakeholders (ACCA, 2009).Therefore, structuring corporate governance to ensure board 
effectiveness is crucial. Several mechanisms have been developed to make sure that companies 
are managed in an effective manner in a way to achieve a maximization of value for both 
shareholders and stakeholders (Aguilera, 2005). 
According to Wang et al. (2009) , globalization is the process by which the global economy is 
transformed from a group of national and regional markets  into a group of markets which 
operates without the existence of national boundaries (Thomas, 2012). Globalization allows 
private sector firms to transfer operations to countries where sound corporate governance as well 
as sound ethical practices are seen to dominate in business. Different researchers Ahunwan, 
(2002), Armstrong (2003), McKinsey and Co. (2002) as cited by Thomas (2012) point out to the 
negative effect of the perceptions of corruption on international foreign direct investment to 
developing countries. Rossouw (2005), in this way, suggests that there has been a recognition in 
Africa that good corporate governance can draw local and foreign investment as well as it can 
prevent both corruption and unethical business practices that damage the business image of 
Africa.  
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In the late 1990s Egypt had begun to place a considerable importance on the issue of corporate 
governance for the realization of a better economic performance and a higher sustainable 
production and growth rates (Fawzy, 2003, the Egyptian Code of Corporate governance for the 
Public Enterprise Sector, 2006, and Dahawy, 2008).  
Egypt had undertaken extensive measures in an attempt to shape up its corporate governance 
practices (Dahawy, 2008). In October 2005 the EIOD1 of the Ministry of Investment had 
published a Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Enterprises in the stock market (the 
Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector, 2006). In 2006 Egypt 
has utilized the OECD guidelines for Governance of State-Owned enterprises and adapted it to 
conform to its laws and regulations (Gamal, 2010). Another code or guidelines of corporate 
governance had been issued. That voluntary code served as a guidebook for state-owned 
enterprise in order to be able to compete with the private sector on an equal footing 
(Kolderstova,  2011; MENA-OECD,  2010;  and the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for 
the Public Enterprise Sector 2006). The code is viewed as a complementary material to the 
introduced legislation – the Egyptian Business Public Sector Law 203 of 19912- which is 
considered an extensive coverage of the practices of corporate governance regarding the holding 
companies and affiliate ones.  
                                                          
1The Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIOD) was inaugurated in 2003 as an initiative to foster better governance. The Ministry of 
Investment (MOI), in 2006, published a Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector.   Although The Egyptian 
Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA, Egypt’s financial market supervisor) was legally obligated to replace EIOD since June 
2011, (the jurisdiction of EIOD was transferred to EFSA ), the organization will continue working as expected on the issue of 
governance in both the private and public sector. 
 
2 This law covers only those corporations that were originally intended to be privatized under the previously 
named Ministry of Public enterprises – Ministry of Investment now, not the whole state-owned sector. 
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However, many of the principles and guidelines in these documents are, for the most part, 
voluntary. In other words, unless the Code of Corporate Governance is specifically enshrined 
within a law or regulation, the firm will not be required to meet the entirety of the standard, code, 
or guideline (Johnson, 2007). The principles also lack clarity and enough details of what 
constitutes board effectiveness and do not give a detailed description about which information to 
disclose.  
In Egypt, joint ventures form a significant and an increasing segment of SOEs. Therefore, 
improving governance in joint ventures established between the state and private partners 
deserves earnest regard. Firstly, this is because such ventures are very familiar in Egypt and 
more commonly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The creation of new Joint 
Venture companies with state participation is still common, even though relatively few new 
SOEs are now being established in countries adopting market- based approaches (Bremer, 2012). 
Secondly, public-private joint ventures encounter specific challenges vis–à–vis governance 
issues that varies in significant respects from those of companies that are wholly state-owned or 
wholly private. The state’s ownership goals may differ heavily from those of the private 
investors. The two groups of owners may have very divergent opinions on such important 
governance challenges as disclosure and transparency, risk appetite, as well as obligations to 
both social and environmental criteria. Thirdly, such companies may in addition be prone to 
complex and vague reporting regimes, partly due to their distinct groups of owners who must 
abide by divergent regulatory restrictions along with reporting requirements which depends on 
whether they are government agencies , listed companies, , state-owned enterprises, privately- 
held companies, other joint venture companies, or even individuals. Achieving Arm’s length 
relations between the regulator and the regulated are unattainable if the government is on both 
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sides of the table. Moreover, as Oseichuk et al. (2009) view the board’s role, IJVs board of 
directors are finding themselves considering a higher number of factors, for instance the lack of a 
shared national environment, regulators associated with government, and community 
organizations. Whereas those above issues often beset international joint ventures that are 
affiliated wholly to the private sector, governmental joint venture partners are expected to 
encounter further pressures from political considerations, competing goals among various 
government shareholders, and nationalistic attitudes pertaining to some stakeholders (Bremer, 
2012).  
Surprisingly, in light of these considerations corporate governance for public-private JVs has not 
gained the required attention (Bremer, 2012). This could be justified by the fact that the issue has 
simply fallen between two stools; neglected by both mainstream analysts of corporate 
governance as well as that handling public sector governance. The formation of such joint 
ventures is very important in Egypt first because  in the petroleum and petrochemical sector 
which is rapidly developing , any foreign investments is required to be made through joint 
ventures where the state holds a 50 percent ownership stake in any formed enterprise . Second, 
joint ventures formed between Egyptian companies and the Egyptian government are considered 
a crucial part of the publicly traded corporate sector.  
Thence, IJVs differ from any other enterprise in the sense that the quality of their board decisions 
is highly influenced by the openness existing among the board of directors as well as by the 
willingness shown on their part to build consensus and come out with a shared vision for the 
future. Child and Faulkner (1998) perceived that monitoring both internal and external 
relationships in an IJV is considered an influential factor in the success of an IJV (Oseichuk et 
al., 2009).Ergo good governance is no longer an option; it became an imperative. Firms are now 
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reconsidering and strengthening the structures of their governance from the boardroom to the 
management level. 
This study aims at examining the extent of differences in perceptions on the boards of oil and 
gas joint ventures between international or domestic private firms and Egyptian state-owned 
companies towards corporate governance practices.  
 
 Why this study aims to focus on the Petroleum Sector? 
In developing nations with considerable oil and gas resources, the petroleum sector is an 
important means of wealth and establishing a sustainable economy as well as positive and good 
long-term human development. Producer governments’ and citizens’ concern over reliance on 
volatile oil revenues has resulted in increasing the stakes, and also led to the rising of public 
expectations (Lahn et al., 2007). The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum oversees the petroleum 
industry through its four holding companies, which act as the government’s agents for 
supervision of supervise oil, gas, and petrochemical activities (AmCham BSAC, 2005).  
 
The four holding companies -- The Egyptian General Petroleum Holding company (EGPC), the 
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS), The Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding 
Company (ECHEM) and Ganoub El Wadi Petroleum Holding Company (GANOPE) -- are 
companies entirely owned by state. In the swiftly growing petroleum and petrochemicals 
Egyptian sector, all foreign investment must be done through joint ventures where the EGPC and 
the contractor retains 50% of ownership (Model concession of agreement, 2013). The petroleum 
sector deserves special consideration to guarantee good governance, not only due to the fact that 
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investments tend to be huge but also because it is widely identified as being prone to specific 
governance challenges.  
The growing focus on petroleum sector governance and its performance in the economy is 
attributed to the difficulties encountered in the attempt to manage oil revenues in an efficient and 
equitable manner, pressure from continuous developing international standards as well as the 
provisions of economic liberalization (Lahn et al., 2007). Amid the hard and tumultuous times 
Egypt is experiencing, the Egyptian Petroleum Sector is suffering from significant debts owed to 
foreign petroleum firms by the Egyptian Government (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2011). The debts 
reached nearly over $4 billion which threatens to hinder oil and gas production stability. 
Therefore more transparency and disclosure are needed –especially after a revolution sparked by 
corruption.  
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Chapter 2 : Statement of the problem 
 
Despite the putative significance of the international joint venture board directors for the success 
of IJV and the  magnitude of research into various issues of IJV operations – for example, 
reasons for the formation of IJVs, performance/instability, management of human resources, 
control, trust, and relationship of inter-partners , governing joint ventures, organizational culture 
/national culture, and impact of cultural diversity on management  (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) – 
no research could be identified, even after an extensive review of literature, that examined the 
difference between the perception of state’s ownership board members and private ones in state-
owned JVs towards the concept of corporate governance and their board effectiveness in Egypt. 
It is very rare one can find any  literature about the  confusion among the different board 
members regarding the way they perceive corporate governance and how effective their board 
should be , and its consequences (Oseichuk et al., 2009). Consequently this might lead to the 
formation of a failing board is characterized by arguments, disharmony and lack of effectiveness 
and sometimes also accompanied by financial turmoil. 
Research Questions: 
 
This study investigates if there are differences in perceptions on the boards of joint 
ventures between international or domestic private firms and Egyptian state-owned companies 
using the oil and gas industry as a case study. The investigative questions are as follows: 
 Whether there are differences among foreign, Egyptian private and Egyptian government 
board members (and all Egyptian directors) in their assessment of the governance 
practices of their boards in terms of the below issues? 
o   Board composition and director capabilities 
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 Board composition and diversity 
 Specific industrial and functional expertise 
 Current capabilities and their future development 
o   Director roles and accountabilities 
 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees 
 Board processes and protocols 
o   Delivery on roles of the Board 
 Strategy 
 Performance management 
 Attitudes toward company performance issues 
 Risk management 
 Talent management 
o   Effective dynamics 
 Preparation and participation 
 Challenge and conflict 
 Effective dynamics 
o   Overall Board effectiveness and renewal 
 Board evaluation 
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 Whether there are differences between Egypt and the GCC board findings? 
 
 Most crucial levers in achieving board effectiveness; 
 
 Time given to the board duties, tasks , and responsibilities; 
 
 Existence of  international expertise in the board rooms; 
 
 Proportion of independent directors on the board; 
 
 Utilization  of board committees; 
 
 Board meeting dynamics  (i.e. the quality of information provided to the board, 
and the level of board members’ preparation and participation in board meetings); 
 
 The presence of a formalized process of evaluation. 
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Chapter 3 : Literature Review 
 
States Owned Enterprise and Governance: 
This section provides an overview of SOEs governance including the principles set out for state-
owned enterprises by OECD, the historical context of the establishment of state-owned 
enterprises in the MENA region, then moves into SOEs governance in Egypt, legal framework 
and regulatory environment in which SOEs are operating, Egyptian state-owned Joint Ventures 
and finally a glimpse of the statutory legal, supervisory and regulatory framework for the oil and 
gas sector in Egypt. 
The misuse of natural monopolies, externalities, failure of capital market and equity issues are 
the most frequently cited reasons for the raison d’etre of SOEs (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012). 
SOEs contribute to the reduction of the unequal distribution of both economic inefficiencies as 
well as surpluses along with the reduction of capital market. Kumar noted that after the 2008 
worldwide financial crisis, SOEs role has become more important than before.   
Growing calls have been made demanding public sectors in many developing countries to offer 
quality public services that satisfy the needs of its citizens, be more accountable for the decisions 
they make and actions they take as well as to manage resources in a more careful and wise 
manner, while promoting private market-led growth (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012).These 
growing calls have been made because of the public sectors’ primary role and its contribution to 
the process of development, particularly in developing nations(Hemming and Mansoor,1988). As 
a part of the public sector, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have noticeable impact on key 
economic indicators including GDP, employment and others, particularly in the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia.  
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State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) especially in developing countries have become the foremost 
targets of numerous reforms in an effort to meet the demands of making them more accountable, 
and hence guaranteeing their efficiency as well as their effectiveness in their performance and 
operations (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012).The reforms that have been introduced to boost the 
efficiency of SOEs in their utilization and allocation of resources can be categorized into 
privatization, more competition and making administrative, political and institutional reforms. 
This is due to the fact that SOEs, in developing economies,  have been identified as one of the 
major sponsors for socio-economic development, but often do not live up to the public’s 
expectations or their market potential. 
In spite of that, evidence on the SOEs performance, as Trivedi (2005) argues, has not been 
promising due to the fact that SOEs have not yielded the results they are expected to render 
particularly with regards to developing economies (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012). The poor 
performance of SOEs has been attributed to several theoretical and empirical factors (Chang 
2007). The World Bank’s Report (1989) pointed out to the fact that the poor performance of the 
public sector and retarded growth is due to its over-extension which leads to the scarcity of 
financial and human resources. This slower growth has chiefly sprung from the increased 
involvement of SOEs in several industries and sectors of developing nations as in public utilities, 
leading governments to be both financially and managerially over-stretched. Moreover, the 
SOEs’ poor performance has pointed to governance issues along with financial propriety issues 
beside others, regardless of ownership structure (Kumar, 2011).  
Increasing evidence backs the opinion that there is a negative relationship between corruption 
and, investment and economic growth in developing nations (Thomas, 2012). Corruption and 
related corporate governance transgressions existing in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) - 
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previously thought to foster development in third-world nations – have become an international 
phenomena. Nicholl (2006) expresses the view that, whereas the public sector is not basically 
obliged to account for economic competitiveness, poor governance existing within this sector 
unavoidably holds back this process of competitiveness. In spite of that, stakeholders’ reactions 
to governance transgressions are starting to rally governments in favor of dealing with operations 
done at SOEs for the purpose of transforming SOEs into organizations nurturing national 
competitiveness (Crawford et al., 2003). 
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises noticed unique 
challenges pertaining to corporate governance encountered by SOEs. “On the one hand, they 
may suffer from undue hands-on and politically motivated ownership which may result in an 
uneven playing field and a loss of transparency. On the other hand, SOEs may also experience 
situations where state ownership can be characterized as passive or distant” (MENA- OECD, 
2010: 31)   In those conditions,  SOEs – especially if it is not a wholly owned-  might experience 
a “dilution of accountability” towards the government, shareholders, stakeholders and the public 
(MENA- OECD, 2010: 31). Originally, corporate governance challenges stem from the fact that 
accountability for SOEs performance comprises of an intricate chain of agents without clear 
identifiable, known principals (MENA- OECD, 2010). 
For more than a decade corporate governance (CG) has been a major policy topic in nations with 
developed market economies (Muhamad, 2009).According to Hashim (2009), CG is a mixture of 
processes and structures directed by the board of directors aiming at authorizing, directing, as 
well as overseeing management for achieving the objectives of the organization. An increasing 
recognition of the importance of effective CG in guaranteeing good quality of financial reports 
has begun to appear in recent years. Effective CG ensures high, sound financial reporting, and 
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credible accounting which in turn leads to the transparency of information which enables users, 
particularly shareholders and investors to make well-informed decisions. Rezaee (2005) indicates 
that the board members are appointed to work as the eyes and ears of the shareholders to assure 
the shareholder value creation. Mallin (2003), stroke a note that CG, in the last decade, has 
managed to grow as well as develop significantly and that many countries have released CG 
codes which includes recommendations that embody good CG, which without suspicion 
contribute towards more transparency and disclosure. Yuan and Yuan (2007) proposed that CG 
has a higher influence on enhancing business efficacy more than an internal control system. 
Enhancing CG is a more effective method than increasing the strength of the internal control 
system in deterring fraud and enhancing business efficiency. 
 
Corporate governance principles and recommendations for state-owned enterprises: 
 
The foundation of corporate governance is based on a system of ethical practices (Young and 
Thyil, 2008) or on a group of relatively shared norms and values which are communicated and 
negotiated (Fleming and McNamee, 2005). It is involved with norms of behavior and values 
along with moral philosophy that direct a corporation’s behavior in a society (Francis and 
Armstrong, 2003). Corporate governance links the relationships between the organization’s 
management, its board of directors along with its stakeholder together by way of structuring 
goals and their means of accomplishment as well as performance monitoring(OECD, 2004) in 
ethically defensible manner (Fleming and McNamee, 2005). 
A growing realization, during the past years, of the requirement for more accountability in the 
public sector, has led to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
which plays a major role in creating guidelines relating to ethical practice in public 
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organizations, mainly but not solely for OECD member countries (Thomas, 2012). The 
Principles of Corporate Governance developed by OECD, published for the first time in 1999 
have received worldwide acknowledgement as an ‘‘international benchmark’’ as well as a tool 
for reference to indicate good corporate governance (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 127). 
These shared principles are being acknowledged internationally as one of the 12 main pillars 
aiming at achieving international financial stability. Subsequently, Principles intended for SOEs 
but put in relation to the general principles, were advanced among the guidelines pertaining to 
Corporate Governance of SOEs (OECD, 2005).  
 
1.1 Principle: the Framework of corporate governance  
This principle focuses on the requirement of a legal and regulatory framework within which 
SOEs function to guarantee that market competition is there, so that any market distortions could 
be avoided. Effective and sound governance should ensure that systems are developed so that to 
manage to oversee the effectuality of this kind of governance framework (Howard and Seith-
Purdie, 2005).  
 
1.2 Principle: key ownership functions 
This principle pinpoints the style of management by government- as being the owner or key 
shareholder of State-Owned Enterprises (Thomas, 2012). It also suggests that SOEs should 
obtain operational autonomy so that their targets- as specified and overseen by government- 
could be accomplished. It is the government’s obligation to guarantee the establishment of 
effective and transparent structure of governance to foster the SOEs long-term interests. 
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Hence, Howard and Seith-Purdie (2005) emphasize the crucial nature of the designation of board 
members to guarantee an effective level as well as mixture of skills. Van der Walt et al. (2006) 
suggest that the composition of the board is determined by the organization’s stage of life, the 
established strategic environment, the ownership structures’ nature as well as the requirements 
set for both governance and performance.  
1.3 Principle: Equal treatment of shareholders 
This Principle advocates the rights pertaining to shareholders; their treatment in an equitable 
manner and their ability to have an equal access to corporate information (Thomas, 2012). It also 
proposes transparency towards shareholders as well as establishing active communication along 
with offering consultation with them. The principle promotes the participation of shareholders 
that constitute a minority. Lu et al. (2009) noticed that getting an equitable treatment should 
encourage the shareholders’ participation in critical decisions as well as it should ease the 
process of posing questions during meetings, ensuring their right to obtain timely relevant 
information that could have an effect on the decision-making process.  
1.4 Principle: Stakeholders’ role in the organization 
Stakeholders are a broader group than that of shareholders (Thomas, 2012). They should be 
given attention by SOEs for having a legitimate concern in firm’s business. Ferrell (2004) 
defines a stakeholder as being an individual or some identifiable group upon which the 
organization’s continued survival is determined. According to Clarkson (1995), primary 
stakeholder grouping is comprised of customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and 
investors. Governments and communities are also categorized as public stakeholders who offer 
infrastructure and markets, where obedience of its laws and regulations are obligatory, and where 
one has to comply with its duties and obligations. Werther and Chandler (2004) noticed the 
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strong association between an organization and its stakeholders and the influence of causing 
damage to these relationships on the organization’s survival. SOEs, in this way, are urged to 
frequently give an account of their stakeholder relationships as well as to create an internal code 
of ethics that consider the rights of stakeholders. Lu et al. (2009) emphasize the significance of 
disclosing matters. This could have an impact on stakeholders like for example: incentive 
schemes, employee benefits, and the way environmental issues are tackled.  
1.5 Principle: disclosure and transparency issue 
This Principle addresses matters as for example:  the need for frequent annual reporting, good 
accounting and auditing criteria, disclosing fully the risk factors, and an annual separate outside 
audit (Thomas, 2012).  
1.6 Principle: Duties of the board members 
The primary responsibilities of the board of directors are outlined involving accountability to 
government including the annual appraisal pertaining its functioning, equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, management oversight, objectivity, impartiality, and independence of judgment, 
attaining of unbiased and just information, the authority to designate and expel the CEO, and the 
formation of specialized committees to aid the board in its task (Thomas, 2012). Much the same 
principles formulated by the USA-based National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD, 
2009) also stress the principal role that the board has in monitoring as well as in accountability, 
involving guaranteeing that the selected board of directors are proficient and dedicated as shown 
in both the time they committed themselves to the organization along with their dynamic 
attention to the task they are having at hand. These principles of the NACD (2009) emphasize 
the necessity for independent, impartial, and nonpartisan board leadership that demonstrates 
integrity, ethics, moral rectitude and reliability all of which inculcates the spirit of the corporate 
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culture. In this way the effectiveness and impartiality of a board can be indicated by simply 
noting how many of the members are not rooting for any ideological party and the need for 
spiritual independence of spirit and structural independence. In the debate about corporate 
governance, the role played by the board of directors has been subjected to scrutiny in such 
domains like the board composition, the board size, internal control, internal audit, risk 
management, and leadership. Nonetheless, it is usually the more small (but important) and less 
measurable constituents within the culture of the board of directors that affect the success of the 
board (Thomas, 2012). Such subjects lay particular stress on for example  board integrity, 
recognizing each and every member’s contribution, opening channels of communication as well 
as promoting constructive and productive debate. Concerning the above mentioned point, Dalton 
and Dalton (2006) perceived that paying whatever amount of attention to effective and 
efficiently process wasn’t enough to deal with directors who are elected and are behaving with 
less, integrity, rectitude, honor, and honesty along with paying less respect for other members.  
 
The bottom line, according to McLellan (2009),is that sound corporate governance pertaining to 
SOEs should involve more appreciation of the relationship existing  between governance, 
compliance and organizational culture, forming adequate structures to foster good governance, 
possessing the knowledge of when to employ teams and hierarchies as well as committees, being 
cognizant of and capable of managing conflicts of interest, handling the various stakeholders’ 
expectations  along with implementing and overseeing the organization’s values.  
 
The origins of state-owned sectors in the region: 
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Historically speaking, MENA countries’ governments have been administrating, controlling, 
planning, and organizing most activities through public institutions (Dawley et al., 2008). As for 
the Arab countries, according to Younis (1996), politics and history as well as law and 
psychology have played a role in producing a restricted process of privatization. This mixture of 
dominance of state and socioeconomic factors has formed the structures of the whole economy 
To fully understand the context in which SOEs function, the role of public sector and the 
challenges it faces, a brief overview of the main political economy factors that lead to the 
emergence of the state as the owner of commercial enterprises in the countries of MENA should 
be discussed (Akoum, 2012 and OECD, 2012). 
Until the 1950s, most of the region was under colonial rule. Some did not even obtain their 
independence until 1970s (Younis, 1996). As a result of the attainment of independence and the 
enjoyment of a considerable degree of political sovereignty, discussions and development 
concerns took place accompanied with a higher degree of open hostility towards colonial powers 
which was shown in the refusal of any political patronage of colonialists as well as their 
economic doctrines though they represented only an economic face of colonialism.  
 
Another repercussion of obtaining independence is that most of the region countries have 
embraced socialism along with a slightly different model of development based on substantial 
state intervention in economic activities, self- sufficiency, protectionism, and import substitution 
(Akoum, 2012, and OECD, 2012). A deluge of nationalization has sprung up, recapturing some 
of the assets to state ownership. Most remarkable examples were the nationalization of Suez 
Canal in 1956 in Egypt and also the nationalization of the oil sector in 1951 in Iran (Akoum, 
2012). 
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This development model’s legacy over the years has formed the state ownership’s structure and 
objectives in the region imposing choices about the frameworks and practices of governance 
(OECD, 2012). In Egypt, SOEs were set up across a group of strategic and non-strategic 
industries. The evolution of SOEs has had a considerable influence on the whole economies of 
the region. The SOE’s impact socio-economy has not waned at all, in spite of the continuous 
zealous privatization programmes in some countries that have begun more than 20 years. SOEs 
have functioned and still function as the prime providers and suppliers of fiscal revenue, cheap 
pubic goods and services (from food to military equipment), and last but not least employment. 
The announcement of the intent of undergoing privatization program has caused a great outrage 
reflected in labour strikes and protests due to the common perception among Egyptians that 
privatization automatically means layoffs (OECD, 2012). 
Now the concerns of the policy makers in the region countries are directly aiming at optimising 
the portfolio of their ownership, improving SOEs standards of governance, setting up public 
private joint venture companies, and definitely boosting the performance of the public sector to 
be in line with the private one sector (OECD, 2012). 
 
SOEs governance in Egypt: 
 
A significant rise in awareness of corporate governance and its advantages has been witnessed in 
Egypt, despite the fact that the concept of corporate governance – known as Hawkamah in 
Arabic- was not known in MENA and Egypt until the 1990s.These reforms and initiatives 
incorporate the inception of the Egyptian Institute of Directors under the umbrella of the 
Ministry of Investment and introduction of two corporate governance codes: the Egyptian Code 
of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 2005 and the Code of Corporate Governance 
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for State-Owned Enterprises in 2006(MENA – OECD, 2010).The principles of the two codes are 
rooted in the OECD guidelines mentioned above. 
Legal framework and regulatory environment in which SOEs are operating: 
 
In most jurisdictions, there are differences between state-owned and private enterprises. These 
differences emanate from various elements as level of government control, legal form, etc. The 
issuance of the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector in July 
2006 was a step of specific significance. The code is considered the first of its kind in the MENA 
region. Its basis is found in the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned 
Enterprises. It has been formed with the OECD experts input. The code, which clearly takes the 
perspective of the state as an owner, defines corporate governance in a broad way as follows “a 
set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders”(MENA – OECD, 2010: 10). 
Egypt has developed a legislation that sets out the requirements of corporate governance for 
SOEs in an attempt to shape ownership structure as well as practices of governance. The Public 
Business Sector Law 203 of 1991 is an example. The purpose of the law is to set out the 
governance frameworks concerning SOEs as well as the stakes owned by the Egyptian 
government in JVs- placed for sale under The AMP3. The law is not applicable to all SOEs; 
exempted from it a number of corporations (that are not monitored by the Ministry of 
Investment) and those4corporations are considered of strategic interest overseen by line 
                                                          
3 Asset Management Programme created by the Ministry Of Investment in 1993 marking the beginning of 
Privatization in Egypt. 
4 Actually MOI only has jurisdiction over the holding companies and the companies that were originally slated for 
privatization (and put under the holding companies). In theory it has jurisdiction over state-owned enterprises, 
but, as I understand it, it is entirely dependent on the companies and the ministries to send in information and, 
basically, they don’t. 1991 is the privatization law and established the Ministry of Investment, earlier called the 
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ministries in sectors of military, banking, water, telecom, production, etc...(MENA – OECD, 
2010; and Amico, 2012). 
The law deals with several major corporate governance practices such as: the constitution of 
the board, requirements for quorum, participation of stakeholder, the composition of the general 
assembly, and requirements of board members’ selection (Amico, 2012). The reform of 1991, 
which intended to reform the structure of ownership, was originally created to provide a support 
to the privatization program, and therefore encompassed only those firms intended to be included 
in this effort under the aegis of Ministry of Investment. 
As the legislative framework has been evolving5, so do too the voluntary corporate governance 
practices for SOEs (Amico, 2012). The legal framework is now supplemented with a code or 
guidelines of corporate governance for SOEs which cover issues that include appointment of 
board members, responsibilities and duties of the board, requirements for disclosure, and 
handling of stakeholders. 
In order to understand the context in which state joint ventures in Egypt operate, there is a need 
to grasp the regulatory context affecting these firms. A major impediment to the effectual 
monitoring of governmental ownership in the Egyptian joint ventures as well as evaluating the 
quality of such monitoring, is that there is no consolidated report on state-owned joint ventures 
or even the state-owned enterprise sector in general (Bremer, 2012; and MENA – OECD, 2010). 
The composition and exact size of the whole Egyptian SOE sector are unknown which hinders 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ministry of public enterprise, but renamed in the reorganization undertaken by Mohie-eddin and Boutros Ghali. 
(Personal communication with Dr. Bremer). 
The MOI website at one point had a listing of companies with their underlying law according to Bremer (personal 
communication), but now this website is not working. 
5 For a clear picture of the Laws governing Public Sector and Holding Companies see Gohneim in Appendix 1. 
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any effective examination of the sector and its constituencies’ governance as well as their 
performance (Bremer, 2012). Hence, no effort was made to form a consolidated report of 
governmental ownership stakes, particularly for the strategic entities overseen by the Military or 
Ministry of Petroleum or corporations of strategic interests like water, banks, and telecom were 
set aside (Bremer, 2012; and MENA – OECD, 2010). This difficulty in obtaining the relevant 
consolidated data and information on the Egyptian SOEs mirrors the lack of a distinct 
government entity having the authority to monitor the whole SOEs sector including state-owned 
joint ventures as well as indicating that there is no streamlined structure for SOEs’ corporate 
governance arrangements and general monitoring (Bremer, 2012). 
In Egypt, There are two prime categories of laws that govern the legal framework dealing with 
the concept of corporate governance (Dahawy, 2008).  Those are the laws which govern 
companies and also listed companies in the Cairo Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE). The laws 
governing the companies’ incorporation in Egypt are as follows: Companies’ Law (CL 
159/1981), Investment Law (IL 8/1997), and Public Business Sector Law (PBLS 203/1991). 
The Companies ‘Law is the one regulating joint stock and limited liability companies, and 
partnerships limited by shares. As for the Investment, it offers some facilities in some specific 
economic and industrial sectors by providing tax free zones and exemption from certain income 
tax (Dahawy, 2008). The Public Business Sector Law governs the incorporation of companies in 
the public business sector and lays out also the governance framework for SOEs (Bremer, 2012; 
and Dahawy, 2008).It differentiates between the public sector and the public business sector.  
The law sets the regulations upon which the relationship between the Holding Companies and 
their affiliated firms is determined. For example the law includes the nomination of the General 
Assembly (GA) of each holding company by the prime minister – This GA is headed by the 
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responsible minister, the nomination of the board of directors of the Holding Companies being 
done by the Prime Minister is based on the relevant minister recommendations6 (Gamal, 2010). 
The Holding companies’ board of directors is the general assembly of all its subsidiaries or 
affiliated companies and half of the board of directors of the affiliated companies is selected by 
the holding company board of directors- The GA (Gamal, 2010). Since law 203, which governs 
state-owned enterprises, is short of the detailed requirements for corporate governance, the 
Egyptian Government saw the dire need to introduce a code of corporate governance to cover 
those missing details in the law, such as the overall framework, transparency and disclosure of 
information, relationship between the board and management, the rights of stakeholders, the 
objectives of ownership and, internal control environment (Gamal, 2010). 
The law also set the legal foundation for privatization by moving 314 public companies from 
government ministries’ authority and regrouping them as subsidiaries overseen by sixteen public 
holdings (Egypt Business Law Handbook, 2009). 
As for subsidiary companies, they are incorporated under Law no. 203/1991, and law no. 
159/1981 (Ghoneim, 2005). Their legal status is that of Joint Stock Companies. Holding 
companies7 are the one who supervises them and it should own more than at least 50% of its 
capital. As for Holding companies, they are subject to the following laws: Law no. 203/1991, 
and law no. 159/1981 and are considered as joint stock companies. As for the ownership, the 
holding companies’ capital is fully owned by the state or public judicial persons (Ghoneim, 
2005). As for the JVs, its stakes are owned by the government and have been sold to foreign 
investors (MENA – OECD, 2010) where the state owns 50%. 
                                                          
6 if the holding companies own the 203 companies, then there is a need to have an independent board along with 
separate board and  general assembly bodies (Bremer personal communication) 
7 This sector is not transparent and very little information is available on how it is structured. 
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State-owned Joint Ventures: 
 
There has been a persistent expansion in the sector of joint ventures over the past 20 years. 
Entities of the state have entered into new partnerships with foreign as well as domestic partners 
(Bremer, 2012).The Ministry of Investment developed a consolidated listing for only the 
corporations it oversees as of 2009. This is because of the sharp decline happened since the 
revolution 2011 in all kinds of regulatory compliance inside government. The database 
belonging to the Asset Management Program– created by the Ministry of Investment - before its 
termination in October 2011 contained 662 JVs. Out of these 662 JVs, 386 were wholly or 
partially owned by one of the nine holding companies overseen by the Ministry of Investment. 
At the same time the holding companies under the aegis of the Ministry of Investment do not 
necessarily include all the public-private JVs in their sector. In addition, 276 JVs were listed as 
being partially owned by other Ministries and entities. Some of these companies’ shares are 
owned by one or more public sector companies or other entities within the public sector. Public 
sector banks and insurance companies represent the largest shares in these non-holding 
companies8 (Bremer, 2012). 
Not only does the database of the Ministry of Investment not include all joint ventures, but the 
nine holding companies under the aegis of the Ministry of Investment are not the only Egyptian 
public sector holding companies (Bremer, 2012);here are five holding companies: The Egyptian 
Petrochemicals Holding Company (ECHEM) , The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company 
(EGAS), Ganoub El-Wadi Petroleum Holding Company (GANOPE), The Egyptian General 
                                                          
8 This actually came from Bremer’s analysis of the data coming from the MOI website concerning holding 
companies and their subsidiaries.  
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Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), and The Egyptian Mineral Resources Authority (EMRA)- 
overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum. Those holding companies own extremely large portfolios 
of public shares in petroleum joint ventures, though they are not disclosed publicly. “The 
ownership structure within the government can be equally complex. It may include ministries, 
public sector firms (including government-owned or JV banks), intergovernmental organizations 
(jointly owned by multiple Arab governments) and other stakeholders such as unions… some, 
but not all, of these ownership shares may be reflected in board positions” (Bremer, 2012: 119). 
 
A brief overview of the statutory legal, supervisory and regulatory framework for the oil 
and gas sector in Egypt: 
 
The key laws governing the petroleum sector include: Law No. 66 for 1953 or what is known as 
the Fuel Raw Materials Law pertaining to the fuel raw materials, Law No. 217 of 1980 
pertaining to Natural Gas, Law No. 61 of 1958 pertaining to the incentives being granted to 
investments concerning natural resources, and Law No. 86 of 1956 relating to quarrying and 
mining (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). As for the laws governing state-owned oil and gas joint 
ventures, they are as follow:  Law no. 89 of 1960 regulating the granting of residence to the 
expatriate personnel of the operating company and the employees appointed by the contractors, 
and Law no. 4 of 1994 promulgating the law concerning the environment. 
EGPC was created under Law no. 20 of 1976 (Model of concession agreement, 2013), while 
EGAS, ECHEM, and GANOPE were established in accordance with Law no. 203/1991 (Egypt 
Oil and Gas, 2013). As for EMRA, it is established under Law No. 86 of 1956. ECHEM is 
established according Law no. 159 for 1981 Business Public Companies Law (public sector 
companies) for joint stock firms, limited partnerships as well as limited liability companies 
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(Ministry of Investment website) and Law no. 95 for 1992 Capital Markets Law (Ministry of 
Petroleum website). 
As for the holdings companies of Petroleum Sector9 , EGAS has 39 subsidiaries or affiliated 
companies. As for ECHEM, there are 8 companies and 12 belong to GANOPE (Egypt Oil and 
Gas companies’ directory)10.  There are also four types of Oil and Gas companies’ 
establishments: 12 Oil and GAS Public sector petroleum companies (12 companies), state-owned 
Oil and GAS joint ventures (41), 106 investment companies (106) and Petroleum multinational 
companies (67). 11 
In Egypt until 2004, the major government agencies involved in the upstream oil and gas sector 
are the Ministry of Petroleum, the EGPC, and the Parliament (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). The 
Ministry of Petroleum is in charge of formulating policies, preparing rules and guidelines, along 
with controlling, coordinating, and monitoring the activities of the oil and gas sector. As for 
EGPC, it is in effect a government agency overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum according to 
the law establishing it. According to the law governing EGPC, it is in charge for the whole oil 
and gas sector’s activities from exploration, production, and transportation through refining12. 
 
And this restructuring included separating the activities of natural gas and petrochemical 
activities from those activities performed by EGPC as well as establish a single agency focused 
on Upper Egypt (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). In 2004, EGAS (Egyptian Natural Gas), ECHEM 
(The Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding Company), GANOPE (Ganoub El-Wadi Petroleum 
                                                          
9 See Appendix 2. 
10 It is noticed that there are discrepancies regarding the number and names of the affiliated companies between 
the Ministry of Petroleum’s directory existing on their website and its hard copy directory. 
11 See Appendix 3. 
12 Although GANOPE and ECHEM are also in this (the latter only in processing). 
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Holding Company), and EMRA (Egyptian General Authority for Mineral Resources) were 
founded by the government where EGAS became responsible for the natural gas activities, 
GANOPE became in charge for managing and overseeing all petroleum activities south of 
latitude 2813 – known as Upper Egypt, ECHEM is responsible for petrochemical activities, and 
EMRA is in charge for assessing, planning, and developing the mineral resources (including 
petroleum and gas). The restructuring process also included the transferring of 14 petroleum 
concessions from EGPC to EGAS. EGAS is now in charge for awarding concessions concerning 
the exploration of non-associated natural gas in the Delta, Mediterranean Sea, as well as in some 
small parts of North Sinai and Red Sea. As for EGPC, it is responsible for awarding concessions 
in the remaining parts of Red Sea and Western Desert. But since there is no law issued to clarify 
these geographic divisions, a scope of conflict developed and continues between the EGPC and 
EGAS jurisdictions. Moreover, in theory, since no legislative amendment has been made to 
EGPS’s mandate, the jurisdiction of EGPC still remains all over the activities concerning 
petroleum in Egypt. 
 
The right for exploration and production of oil and gas is granted by the Ministry of Petroleum 
according to the Egyptian Law No.86 for 1959, taking the shape of a concession agreement held 
between the contractor (i.e. the bidding firm succeeded in obtaining the concession) and the 
Egyptian state -represented by the Ministry of Petroleum and EGPC or EGAS as relevant- 
(Model of concession agreement, 2013). The parliament enacted a law allowing the Petroleum 
Minister to conclude the Concession Agreement between the Egyptian state on one side , and 
EGPC – the concession holder- and the foreign oil company (i.e. the contractor) on the opposite 
side, granting the right to produce and explore oil and gas in a particular zone and according to 
                                                          
13 Beni Suef, El Fayoum, El Menia, Assiut, Sohag ,Qena ,Luxor And Aswan (GANOPE website). 
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the stipulations set in the law as well as the rules, procedures “that have the force of Law and 
prevail over other Egyptian Legislation including the above mentioned Law No. 66 for 1953 as 
amended” (Model of concession agreement, 2013: 9 ). 
The agency that leads the negotiations of the concession agreement is either EGPC or EGAS, as 
applicable (Model of concession agreement, 2013). Then after negotiation takes place, this 
agreement will be referred to the concerned Minister – the Petroleum Minister- for approval. 
Once the approval of the Minister is obtained, the agreement is submitted to the People’s 
Assembly where the Energy Committee makes a report and then a vote is held by members of 
parliament on promulgating of the concession agreement as a law.  
EGPC or EGAS, as applicable, then announce and administer the petroleum bidding rounds 
(Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). The bidders are evaluated and selected first according to their 
technical qualifications and financial abilities and then are assessed on the commercial terms of 
their bids. Model forms of the concession agreement for both EGPC and EGAS are used, “which 
are the basis for negotiations. The Model Agreements are produced by the State Council and are 
subject to periodic revisions. Under the Model Agreements, the parties agree an initial 
exploration period and the number and period of any extensions to such initial exploration 
period. Typically, the initial exploration period is two and a half years, starting from the effective 
date of the concession agreement. The contractor may be granted two successive extensions of 
three years and two years respectively” (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013: 2). 
In the development phase, EGPC or EGAS, as relevant, and the foreign oil investor will establish 
an operating company in Egypt governed by the Egyptian law where it will be 50% - 50%of the 
shares of the newly established company. Each party has the right to designate four board 
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members to its board and replace them at any time. The chairman appointed by EGPC is also the 
managing director. As for the contractor, the foreign oil investor nominates the General Manager 
who will be at the same time another managing director on the same board as the Concession 
Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation stipulates: 
“Operating Company shall have a Board of Directors consisting of eight (8) members, four (4) of 
whom shall be designated by EGPC and the other four (4) by CONTRACTOR. The Chairman 
shall be designated by EGPC and shall also be a Managing Director. CONTRACTOR shall 
designate the General Manager who shall also be a Managing Director.” (Article VIII: 81) 
According also to the Model form of the concession agreement published on the Ministry of 
Petroleum website, “ the operating Company and contractor  shall, for the purpose of this 
Agreement, be exempted from the following laws and regulations as now or hereafter amended 
or substituted: 
 Law No. 48 of 1978, on the employee regulations of public sector companies; 
 Law No. 159 of 1981, promulgating the law on joint stock companies, partnership 
limited by shares and limited liability companies; 
 Law No. 97 of 1983 promulgating the law concerning public sector organizations and 
companies; 
 Law No. 203 of 1991 promulgating the law on public business sector companies; and 
 Provisions of part 2 of Chapter 6 of Law No. 88 of 2003, organizing dealings in foreign 
currencies.”(Model of  Concession Agreement, 2013: 27) 
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Finally, it is remarkable that very scant information is to be found on this sector of SOEs in 
Egypt, as well as  the Egyptian holding companies along with  its subsidiaries and if 
information was to be found, it is usually confusing, and tangled especially when it comes to 
the regulatory laws and statutory structure that the sector abide by. This is considered an 
issue that puts the status of transparency in question. 
Board Effectiveness and Governance: 
 
This section of the literature review on board effectiveness and corporate governance in IJVs 
(IJVs, hereafter) will be categorized into two sections: Board effectiveness and Governance, and 
Disagreements and Conflicts in IJVs Boards. The first section looks into the relationship between 
corporate governance and board effectiveness and highlights the problems and conflicts 
occurring in an IJV related to the governance structure, contractual agreement, and division of 
ownership and control. As for the second section, it will look into the criteria of having an 
effective board of directors and the board processes as well as the reasons leading to potential 
conflicts and the types of conflicts which adversely affect board effectiveness and IJVs 
performance in general. 
The IJVs’ contemporaneous popularity and the discontent with their performance resulted in a 
literature which indicates that IJV board directors can play a critical role in IJV success (Petrovic 
et al., 2009). In theory, the board of directors is the one responsible for formulating long-term 
corporate strategy. It is the one that assigns those who are fit to carry it out, and oversees the 
performance and outcome against the strategy being put.  Therefore , a failed performance and a 
bad governance always starts with a board of directors not achieving its duties , tasks and 
responsibilities towards the organization it serves (OECD, 2011). Shenkar and Zeira (1987) 
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defined an IJV as "a separate legal organizational entity representing the partial holdings of two 
or more parent firms, in which the headquarters of at least one parent firm is located outside the 
country of operation of the joint venture. This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent 
firms, each of which is economically and legally independent of the other"(Shenkar and Zeira, 
1987: 56). This involves two or more companies determining the strategic direction and 
operational matters of the JV Company (Petrovic et al., 2009). 
IJV has a distinctive, “fragile” structure of governance – incomplete contracting and shared 
sovereignty (Pearce, 1997:198).  It is considered a quasi- hierarchy in terms of the shared 
ownership and the existence of a contractual agreement which specifies what will be the nature 
of this sharing. The uniqueness of JV governance form originally emanates from the creation of a 
contractual agreement so that to determine the frame of the administration of the joint 
sovereignty. The JV governance structure represents a great burden in terms of the bargaining 
costs due to the presence of parental differences which could have a negative effect on the firm 
performance as well as its survival. This makes it less efficient and fragile. The term bargaining 
means that a group of activities, which attend the process of the completion and execution of the 
agreement, indicates that the contractual agreement that establishes the company is incomplete. 
This is because, the contract is not either addressing the issues it should tackle or the issues are 
not fully covered. At least four important issues should be tackled in the JV contracts to define 
the nature of the relationship between the parties. The First issue is the extent and nature of risks 
that are accepted or imposed. The second one is the specification of outcomes and how the 
rewards would be distributed. The third one is the asset or resource commitment of each party. 
The last one is what are the procedures and systems that determine the allocation of 
responsibilities and duties, control, and authority. 
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However, the determination of a mutual agreement on the terms and conditions tackling the 
above areas mentioned in the JV contract will result in different degrees of uncertainty faced by 
the JV parents due to an absence of trust and differences in objectives and goals. According to 
Bremer (personal communication), though the IJV partners may divide the management roles in 
the IJV reflecting their respective competencies and comparative advantage relative to the other 
partner. For example, in oil and gas IJVs here (Egypt), the local partner is usually given the 
operating role. In Chinese JVs, the local partner may be given the manufacturing role while the 
international partner is expected to be more involved in international marketing. In both cases, 
the inability to control key operational functions may increase risk for the foreign partner (from 
inefficiency, less control over pollution, poor quality, reduced ability to control fraud by the local 
partner, etc.).There is frequently a divergence of interests between parent companies in respect to 
their IJV, which may demonstrate a “mixed motive scenario” encompassing both co-operation 
and competition (Pearce, 1997: 198). This can easily cause conflicts between partners over 
priorities and a temptation to act in opportunistic ways, that is, to obtain benefits from the 
alliance, beyond the extent reciprocally agreed upon, in areas where the IJV contract is 
incomplete. This adversely affects the performance of IJV.  
 
Thence, any successful IJV operation inherently relies on the establishment of a proper 
governance structure reflecting the partners’ respective equity share as well as management 
control. The board then articulates the IJV partners’ collective goals or, as noted earlier, some 
combination of shared and differentiated goals (Lee et al., 2003). The IJV governance structure 
emerges as a contingent result of bilateral negotiations between prospective partners who have 
imported various sets of resources to the joint venture. Therefore, the ownership and eventual 
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distribution of control will result in part from the relative bargaining power and capacity owned 
by the prospective participants, who may come from distinct cultural environments and also 
different institutional backgrounds as well as differing with respect to the needs of their 
businesses themselves, practice in the home countries, or other factors. 
 It also could result in conflicting control expectations between the partners that can result in 
tensions and stress on the IJV board. For instance, the levels of parental satisfaction may or may 
not concur with standard accounting measures. In other words, , a JV may be seen as being  
unsuccessful by one or more of the partners despite achieving positive financial outcomes, 
simply because the IJV did not live up to the partner’s expectations (Mohr, 2002). For instance, a 
German GM on the board of a German-Chinese Joint Venture was interviewed and questioned 
about the performance of the JV which he represents, he replied as follows :” I usually 
distinguish between two issues: success can be seen as strategic or financial. Regarding the 
strategic success, I have to say that we have surpassed our initial expectation very quickly: 
market share, purchasing, and sales... in those areas we have made more progress than we 
originally had hoped for. In financial terms, though, we have not met our objectives” (Mohr, 
2002: 5). 
Because Each of the parent firms has its unique mode of operation, structure, and objectives as 
the two of the parent companies are at least anchored in dissimilar national and cultural 
surroundings and each group of employees (expatriates of parent country or host country, 
transferees of parent country or host country, host country nationals, or third country nationals) 
has its own characteristics and qualities which stems from its nationality, work place , entity of 
recruitment, position in the IJV hierarchy, legal rights and promotion possibilities, and 
sometimes (often) pay and benefits.  
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The nature of the conflict is not conducive for success according to (Bogun, 2008). For instance, 
conflicts are more likely leading to lower satisfaction levels within the group- work groups and 
management teams- and to less desire to stay in the group. As a result “frustration, 
unpleasantness and dissatisfaction is likely to contribute to managers losing interest in, or in 
extreme cases even terminating, their IJVs” (Bogun, 2008: 2). Interviews carried out by the 
authors suggest that even little amounts of conflict can be destructive and fatal for human 
interactions and the performance of the IJV and thus have to be averted. Following are several 
quotations from the interviews conducted: “When conflict exists between parent firms in a joint 
venture, the joint venture has little possibility of reaching its top possible performance” (Bogun, 
2008: 2); “In fact, I have found that conflicts that directly involve the joint venture are the most 
detrimental” (2000:148); “conflict is something like a cancer” (Bogun, 2008: 2).  
Disagreements and Conflicts in IJVs Boards: 
The section aims to shed light on the conflicts influencing board effectiveness and their 
implications on the operations of JVs.  
In contemporary management, the issue of JVs conflicts and their reduction along with their 
elimination are considered a significant area of research. Several research outcomes regularly 
stress that there are differences existing between the perceptions of partners coming from 
developed countries and those coming from developing ones, as well as the differences exist also 
between private partners and public ones (Jamali, 2004). 
In order to identify the different factors causing conflict, it is necessary to put into consideration 
the most common and pernicious conflicts affecting  negatively the performance of IJVs and 
they are as follow: values, styles of management, functional area: knowledge and skills, and 
effort norms.  
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Criteria of Board Effectiveness: 
 
Board effectiveness is highly reliant on socio-psychological processes, especially those relating 
to group participation, intercommunication, exchange of information, and discussions (Oseichuk 
et al., 2009).  
Board effectiveness is judged by two criteria: Board task performance and Board cohesiveness. 
Board task performance is described as the capability of the board of directors to fulfill its 
control and service tasks in an effective way (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In order to accomplish 
the control task, particular activities should be fulfilled, such as giving approval regarding key 
initiatives suggested by the management, making decisions about compensations, hiring, and 
replacing the most senior managers of the company. As for the service task, it includes activities 
like offering expertise and insight when crucial situations demand them, like during restructuring 
of the organization or an acquisition. Service task includes also informal and ongoing tasks; for 
example: coming up with strategic options and alternatives during meetings of the board.  
As for the board cohesiveness, it is the ability of the board members to stay on the board and 
continue working with each other (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). While board task performance 
directly affects company’s performance, cohesiveness has an indirect impact on the 
organization’s performance affecting the current and future levels of board task performance. In 
turn, the board members’ ability to keep working together, as demonstrated by board 
cohesiveness, is in part affected by board members’ degree of attraction to each other. Moreover, 
the work groups’ literature suggests that when members of a group are more attracted to one 
another, they tend to achieve higher levels of satisfaction as well as higher levels of commitment 
to the group (Petrovic et al., 2009). Hence, it leads to an atmosphere of trust, as Williams 
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&O’Reilly (1998) explain, which spread among Board members a willingness to trust in each 
other’s judgment and expertise, whereas boards with very low levels of interpersonal attraction 
and cohesiveness cannot sustain such trust. Moreover, in some ways, it is found that 
cohesiveness improves decision making process through encouraging earlier discussions of 
alternative scenarios. It also improves decision making process by enhancing more 
comprehensive discussion of alterative options and scenarios.  
Board Processes and their Influences on the Effectiveness of the Board: 
There are several processes that are more likely to affect both the board’s task performance and 
its cohesiveness: Differences in values (Bogun, 2008), differences in management style, 
functional area knowledge and skills, effort, norms, and language barrier (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999).  
Categorization of the reasons leading to conflicts in JV: 
Values: 
The major reason for conflicts may be incongruities in values, which Hofstede et al. (1990) argue 
adopted by individuals: “The core of culture is formed by values, in the sense of broad, 
nonspecific feelings of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, normal and abnormal, rational and 
irrational - feelings that are often unconscious and rarely discussible, that cannot be observed as 
such but are manifested in alternatives of behavior” (1990: 291). 
Dissimilar values may lead to stress and negative feelings. Whereas Hennart & Zeng directed 
their attention to values on the organizational level “a firm’s values are largely a reflection of its 
national culture, and JV parents based in different countries will tend to have different values” 
(2002: 700). Values are defined as “the individual’s personal preference in work-and life-related 
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issues” (Hofstede et al., 1993: 490); they are linked to different and various concepts, that 
involves objectives, solving problems, resolving conflict (Hennart & Zeng, 2002), a desire for 
security, work centrality, a desire for authority (Hofstede et al., 1990) and, informal relationships 
and oral agreements that are a fundamental constituent of trust (George et al., 1998).  
Different styles of management: 
Bogun (2008) argued that differences in IJV partners’ management style can lead to 
contradictions and differences resulting in conflicts (Bogun, 2008). Managers who are from 
different countries differ widely regarding their conception of what constitutes effective and 
efficient managerial practices. It is found that differences in French-German IJVs’ managerial 
style resulted in conflicts in three major phases: start-up, maturity and end.  It also has its adverse 
effect on functional area, managerial practices, and meeting deadlines. It is found that applying a 
clear style of management to suit a given environment cause higher economic productivity. 
It is also discovered that whereas Hungarian managers were more authoritarian and had more 
powerful and potent roles, German managers confer autonomy on their inferiors. They were 
more team-oriented; including others in the decision-making process.  
Differences in functional area: knowledge and skills  
Diversity in functional area: knowledge and skills leads to conflicts that occur on two levels: 
Organizational level and individual one.  
 Conflicts happening on an organizational level: 
The board of directors is required to demonstrate a higher level of specialized knowledge and 
skills in order to ensure its performance effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Functional area 
knowledge and skills cover the traditional fields of business, such as strategic and operational 
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management, production, finance, marketing and accounting, along with those fields that relate 
to the company’s association with its environment, such as law. According to Ancona & 
Caldwell (1988), the board of directors is identified as strategic-issue-processing and elite 
groups14 and hence, its members must have knowledge and skills in such domains or have access 
to outside networks which can help in gathering information and solving problems. 
According to Gupta, & Govindarajan (2000), countries exhibiting advanced economic 
development level are more liable to be the sources of managerial and marketing, technological 
know-how than less developed countries. For example, Danis, & Parkhe (2002) noticed that 
Hungarian managers did not possess written strategy and marketing knowledge in Hungarian-
Western partnerships, and had a narrow understanding of their mission. U.S. and Chinese 
partners have different priorities in administrating and supervising IJV operations (Ding, 1997).  
It is found that substantial differences in strategic targets between IJV partners of U.S. and China 
exist (Bogun, 2008). Whereas the U.S. partners devoted their attention to entering the local 
market and gaining profit in China, the Chinese partners sought to upgrade and enhance 
technology and management. The Chinese managers and workers also were resistant to carry out 
company policies on budgets, duties, and performance evaluation meetings.  
 Conflicts happening on an individual level: Language Barrier and its implications: 
Language barriers could moreover lead to more conflicts (Bogun, 2008). For instance, Bogun 
(2008) noticed that American and Polish managers devoted time to looking at various words that 
are missing in Polish language and attempting to think of a combination of words that are 
understandable in Polish and have a meaning close to the English. In the Russian-Swedish 
                                                          
14They are at the apex of the firm making high- level decisions; not involved in the implementation process and 
producing an output that is cognitive in nature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) 
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partnerships, language barrier brought about a feeling of “us” and “them” resulting in an absence 
of team spirit. On the other hand, having the same language might involve decreased 
communication costs. Language is an instrument to report on what is really going on around and 
this creates a kind of trust that is an absolutely essential necessity for effective performance and 
functioning in IJVs.  
What connects us with the origin of language is the human desire to establish connection with 
one another and to express themselves (Corsen, 2009). When this connection takes place, an 
interactive relationship between one’s traditions, conventions, and one’s verbal living 
experiences as a society starts to be established. This process of interaction is what gives one’s 
world its shape and therefore culture and language are what determine the perception of the 
world around us. This relationship between language and human thought turns to be our cultural 
reality. It is also the way by which humans relate to each other. (Gamsriegler, 2005) stressed that 
verbal traditions plays a very important role in shaping perceptions. In other words, the 
connection between language and people forms our relationship with knowledge through 
opening a way that helps us in interpreting and understanding the world through its cultural 
elements. 
If we take the concept of “time” as an example; Time is perceived differently in the United 
States than in the Czech Republic (Corsen, 2009). According to Corsen (2009), North Americans 
think of the hour that just passed while the Czechs picture the hour that is coming ahead. If time 
is 9:15, North Americans will tell it as a quarter past nine or fifteen minutes after nine while 
Czechs will state it as a quarter of ten. North American will often address the hour emerging next 
when time is coming near the hour. Hence 9:45 could be stated as a quarter to ten, but 9:15 is 
seldom described as having an association with the hour coming up next. The time definitions 
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given could seem insignificant, but these could show an inclination to concentrate on the past 
instead of the future ahead and this is based on a particular interpretation and understanding of 
time. 
Another illustration of the differences in linguistic style that could affect communication and 
lead to misunderstandings is the differences in cultures between partners (George et al., 1998). 
For example in the United States and Germany, George et al. (1998) noted that people 
communicate with each other without beating around the bush, their objective is to receive and 
deliver information in a direct and explicit way with less regard to the context. As in China, 
Korea and Japan, many words are left unsaid; people tend to confer the meaning of their 
messages in an implicit and indirect way, through the physical context which involves facial 
expressions, behavior, signs or signals, and tone of voice until the person engaged in the 
conversation get or decodes the message in a right way. This is because their main objective is to 
maintain and reinforce relationships by face-saving (Gamsriegler, 2005). Another difference is 
shown in the way a Japanese and a German communicates as Gamsriegler (2005) explains. A 
German will not be able to figure out or expect the needs of the others as he depends more on the 
direct verbal message than relying on facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice whereas a 
Japanese relies more on body language.  
Effort Norms: 
Effort is an individual-level construct regarding the intensity and strength of individuals' 
expected task performance behavior (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Effort norms as a group-level 
construct are the shared beliefs of a group concerning the degree of effort each individual is 
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expected to put towards a task assigned to. Norms usually have a strong impact on the behavior 
of members, especially in groups such as boards.  
A strong effort norms improves the effort of individual group members (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999).Effort may be expressed by the time devoted to the duties or the time given for 
maintaining accurately budgeted schedules. A relationship was found between time dedicated by 
directors to their duties and effective governance. Particularly, directors who devote adequate 
time to their tasks and try to obtain the information at a timely fashion are better capable of 
thwarting or resolving crises. On the other hand, divergent perceptions of the time required to 
accomplish negotiations, for example, may lead to impediments, failure, and negative affect 
(George et al., 1998). 
It was discovered that cultural differences in effort norms caused conflicts in U.S.-Chinese IJVs 
(Bogun, 2008). Whereas the U.S. partner wished for a clearly and sharply outlined timetable, the 
Chinese partner wanted a loose and non-binding schedule. A divergence is also noticed in the 
work time standards and norms in the US and Japan on one hand, and in Hungary, India and 
China, on the other hand. The software engineers, in both China and Hungary, exhibited striking 
differences in the standards and norms of their work-time. Engineers in China stuck firmly to 
time intervals when the workday started and ended, working strenuously during these periods, 
but seldom functioning significantly longer. Chinese engineers showed marked resistance to the 
likelihood of working extra hours or over weekends. As for the working hours in Hungary, they 
were not as overwhelmingly long as they are in the US or Japan. In the US many types of 
workers were likely to work seventy or eighty hours/week regularly, with additional effort 
especially during laborious and hard times. On the other hand, a study conducted noted that 
engineers in Japan tend to sacrifice their holidays, interests and hobbies, and even their family 
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life for the sake of work. Therefore, it is found that differences existing in effort norms 
pertaining to IJV partners could result in difficulties with control measures along with higher 
governance costs which could eventually result in conflicts. Anxiety and nervousness ensue as a 
result of uncertainty and lack of trust, which, in turn, lessens the degree of cooperation among 
board members, as it was found in a research conducted on U.S. - Chinese IJVs operating in 
China.  
Hence, it is noted that the diversities and differences in functional area, perception, management 
styles, and effort norms discussed above are the most common factors causing conflicts among 
IJVs board members as shown in the below figure: 
 
 
Figure 3-1- A Model of factors leading to conflicts in IJVs 
Adapted from:  Bogun (2008: 8) 
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In this figure, four dimensions presented as possible reasons for arising of conflicts in IJVs: 
functional area knowledge and skills, individual perceptions of reality; effort norms, and 
management styles. Differences in functional area knowledge and skills along with differences in 
perception of reality and interpretation of phenomena lead to the unawareness of board 
members’ capabilities which consequently lead to difficulties in communication and transfer of 
knowledge. Diversity in effort norms causes a lack of trust, arising of free-rider problem. Other 
problems are poor preparation , and lack of trust, for instance, member A thinks member B did 
not do the tasks he has been assigned and he is unprepared to consider the issues to be decided. 
As for the differences in management styles, coordination difficulties pursue. All these 
diversities in the four dimensions may cause management complexities leading to conflicts 
which in turn affect adversely the IJV performance.  
 
Literature Conclusion: 
Building on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, this study aims to investigate the 
extent of differences in the perceptions of IJV board members representing the state with those 
representing the private partners concerning corporate governance tools. Bottom line is that the 
diversity in IJV board in terms of different backgrounds, expectations, goals, objectives 
represents a challenge and this could in turn affect the satisfaction of both partners regarding the 
implementation of good governance. IJV boards are more prone to suffer from conflicts because 
they are more likely to have the characteristics that ignite conflicts, including differences in 
functional areas, management styles, language, and effort norms. 
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Chapter 4 : Methodology 
 
Overview of the methodologies from the literature: 
Several methodologies were found in the literature not directly addressing the aim of this 
research which is Boardroom Governing Dynamics: A Case Study of State-Owned Oil and Gas 
Joint ventures in Egypt.  
The Board Directors Institute developed a methodology to explore board effectiveness in GCC 
countries through a survey distributed on board members in order to improve board 
effectiveness. The GCC Board Directors Institute (BDI) had done a survey on all GCC countries 
on more than 100 GCC board members in 2009 and on more than 200 GCC board members in 
2011 in order to figure out the recent important state of affairs regarding the effectiveness of the 
board of directors (Building Better Boards, 2009 and Embarking on a Journey, 2011). The 
intention of this survey is to identify the key strengths and opportunities for surmounting the 
hurdles getting in the way of reinforcing board effectiveness in the region (Building Better 
Boards, 2009), to drive business performance (GCC Board Effectiveness and Governance 
Survey, 2009), to spread the spirit of team work, and to know how good do the directors 
collaborate with senior leadership (Building Better Boards, 2009).   
Oseichuk et al. (2009),  in their research Workings of the board: Case of the International Joint 
Venture "Arman", Kazakhstan, delve deep to answer “How does the Board of Directors of the 
International Oil and Gas Joint Venture ‘Arman’ balance conflicting agendas whilst 
contributing to responsible corporate practice?” they investigate the structure and composition 
of the board of directors , their roles and duties, along with the way they balance different issues 
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, which conflict with the practices of corporate responsibility. In their study, Oseichuk et al. used 
semi-structured interviews- face-to-face and via emails, telephone as well as contextual 
observation- a context driven observation. The interviews included International Joint Venture 
“Arman” local and western board members along with local and western managers, regulatory 
agencies and contractors- parties connected with the activities of the board (Oseichuk et al., 
2009). As for contextual observational method , Oseichuk et al. (2009) argued that it was 
employed to “pick out what is relevant for analysis and piece it together to create tendencies, 
sequences, patterns and orders” (Ericson et al., 1991: 55). This method was less structured; it 
aimed to obtain “the perspectives of social actors, their ideas, attitudes, motives and intentions, 
and the way they interpreted their social world” (Oseichuk et al., 2009: 113). It also intended to 
qualitatively capture the human behavior so that it can explain shared culture as well as social 
meaning. Triangulation method, that is comparing data collected from various sources, was also 
adopted, it was employed to check whether the answers of the respondents were valid or not 
(Oseichuk et al., 2009). 
Methodologies Planned to be Employed in the Thesis: 
The questionnaire used is based on one developed by the GCC Board of Directors Institute in the 
UAE (GCC BDI)15, which conducted a board effectiveness survey in order to develop the 
board’s performance. Although not specifically developed to compare local and foreign board 
members of IJV boards, many of the issues addressed are similar to those dealt with in this study. 
A modified form of the GCC BDI questionnaire, has been applied which originally developed by 
McKinsey. It has been modified in collaboration with the thesis supervisor to lessen the number 
of questions and make the survey more suitable to serve the aim of the study. 
                                                          
15The GCC Board Directors Institute (BDI) is a non- profit organization aiming at promoting board effectiveness in 
the GCC region.(Building Better Boards, 2009) 
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 This questionnaire, which is used with the permission of the BDI, addresses the following areas: 
Board dynamics, delivery against key board roles, composition of the board, capabilities of the 
directors, the roles and accountabilities of directors, structure of the board and, board 
effectiveness and renewal policy. A 5-point Likert scale is also employed. 
The survey is distributed in person by the researcher on the state-owned joint ventures in the oil 
and gas sector in Egypt. The survey is distributed to 13 oil and gas JV companies where there are 
8 board members in each (4 of them are representing the Egyptian Government and the other 4 
are representing the foreign oil investor) after getting the permission of Ministry of Petroleum 
(MoP) and CAPMAS. The criteria for selecting those 13 oil and gas JV companies were as 
follows: Having an access to them, being state-owned Joint-venture companies, and having a 
mix of domestic and foreign board members. 
 
A quantitative analysis is employed relying on SPSS software analysis system (cross-tabulation 
and bar charts) as well as descriptive analysis is also included. A qualitative analysis is also 
employed where 12 board members were interviewed about what the challenges, they face in 
their boards, hindering board effectiveness are.  
 
Question Categories:  
The survey questions will tackle 7 categories, which comprise of: 
1. Please tell us a little about yourself  
2. Board composition and director capabilities: 
 Board composition and diversity 
 Specific industrial and functional expertise 
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 Capabilities and knowledge development 
3. Director roles and accountabilities 
 Director roles and accountabilities 
 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees 
 Board processes and protocols 
4. Delivery on roles of the Board  
 Strategy 
 Performance management 
 Attitudes toward company performance issues 
 Risk management 
 Talent management 
5. Effective dynamics 
 Preparation and participation 
 Challenge and conflict 
 Effective dynamics 
 Interaction with senior management 
6. Overall Board effectiveness and renewal 
 Board renewal 
 Board evaluation 
7. Final Comments 
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Limitation of the study: 
 
Several factors imposed some limitations on this study. Access to state-owned joint 
ventures in the oil and gas sector in Egypt tends to be very limited and difficult. Consequently 
this constitute a barrier and a limitation in itself. Hence a further limitation was encountered, 
which is the sample size. It was planned to have 8 surveys distributed on 25 companies with 8 
board members in each but due to the difficulty of the access we only had 13 companies while 
there are 41 state-owned JVs in the oil and gas sector in Egypt. I managed to obtain the approval 
of the Ministry of Petroleum orally or more specifically via telephone. They refused that I go by 
myself to the intended companies and rather offered to distribute the questionnaire but nothing 
came out. I kept contacting them again and again and offered a final resolution to go by myself 
but in vain. I finally resorted to distribute it through informal channels “contacts”. The research 
also was constrained by the amount of time available as the whole study took 3 whole years and 
has to be finished within the planned academic semester Spring/summer 2015. Financial 
constraints also constituted another limitation as the research is not supported by any grants or 
funds.  
The successfulness of the outputs information generated from the survey depended on 
one main factor which is the quality of the survey data obtained from board members; that is 
their readiness to participate along with the level of forthrightness, honesty, and accuracy during 
the answering of the survey questions. 
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Chapter 5 : Analysis of Data 
 
A quantitative analysis of the questionnaire of state-owned JV boards in the Oil 
and Gas Sector in Egypt: 
In this chapter, a quantitative analysis is going to be applied on a hundred board members in 
state-owned JVs in the oil and gas sector. The aim of the analysis is to compare differences, in 
perspectives towards corporate governance practices, lying between local- Egyptian board 
members who represent the state as an owner, Egyptians representing the private partner on one 
side and foreign board members or IJV boards on the other side in Egypt; it figures out what are 
the barriers and hurdles that could prevent having an effective board in the Oil and Gas state-
owned enterprises in Egypt.  
The analysis will addresses the following areas that are tackled in the questionnaire: Board 
dynamics, delivery against key board roles, composition of the board, capabilities of the 
directors, the roles and accountabilities of directors, structure of the board, board effectiveness 
and renewal policy. 
According to the surveyed board members, it is clear that there is no huge differences in the 
following sub-categories tackled in the questionnaire: specific industrial and knowledge 
expertise – i.e. core governance and compliance , industry / sector expertise, talent management, 
and functional knowledge-, the capabilities and knowledge development, Risk management,  
Decision- making, Interaction with senior management, and Board evaluation. However, based 
on the study, the differences exist in the following categories/sub categories: 
1-  Board Composition and Directors’ Capabilities: 
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For the purpose of this study, board composition is defined as a combination of experiences and 
knowledge, a mix of both different perspectives and backgrounds, and having the adequate 
amount of time the board devotes to their roles.  
The foreign board members of the private firms feel that their boards can be enhanced further by 
taking those three actions:  
- Amendment of the nomination and appointment process of the directors. 
- Having the right board size by increasing the number of the board. 
- Introduction of independent directors into their board. 
- The rotation of the board should be addressed in a way that allows new talented members 
could join in. 
Having expertise on governance issues within the board according to an American board 
member interviewed could be strengthened by having more knowledge on the newest trends in 
management, industry, business, and board processes. Diversity in board composition should 
also exist to reflect the population. The oil and gas state-owned joint ventures in Egypt consist of 
8 board members and this is low number if it is compared to Europe which gives a room to 
introduce independent directors into the board room. For example in the United Kingdom 
independent directors constitute 91%, while in France they are 57%. In the GCC region, they 
represent 46% (GCC, 2009). 
The study reveals that there is a dissatisfaction with the board composition on the part of the 
foreign board members who represent the foreign partner in the following areas:  
 
Board composition and Diversity: 
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The study finds that 40% of the foreign board members representing the private partner see that 
the effectiveness of the process of nomination and appointment of new board members need to 
be tackled, while 48% think there is no problem with the process. As for the Egyptian board 
members representing the private partner, 60% view that the process is effective and 22% 
oppose. As for the local board members representing the state, 72% view there is nothing wrong 
with the process whereas only 16% disagree/strongly disagree with this statement, as Figure (1) 
and Figure (2) illustrate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: EBS (The Egyptian Board Members Representing the State) Nomination 
and Appointing of New Directors 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
As Figure (5-1) shows the percentage of respondents of the EGY board members 
representing the state (EBS) on whether the board has an effective process for nominating and 
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appointing new directors. The EGY board members of the state (EBS) responded in the 
following manner: 6% disagree, 12% neutral, 36% agree, and 36% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-2: EBP (The EGY board members representing the private partner) and FBP (The foreign 
boards representing the private partner) Nomination and Appointing of New Directors 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-2) shows the Percentage of respondents of the EGY board members representing the 
private partner (EBP) and the foreign boards representing the private partner (FBP) on whether 
the Board has an effective process for nominating and appointing new directors. The EBP 
responded: 4.3 % strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 4.3% neutral, 69.6 % agree, 4.3% strongly 
agree. The FBP: 14.8% strongly disagree, 25.9% disagree, 11.1 % neutral, 37% agree, 11.1% 
strongly agree. 
55% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the view that the 
board has an ideal size while only 33 %agree/strongly agree. While the Egyptian board members 
representing the private partner, 69% agree/strongly agree and 30% disagree/ strongly disagree. 
As for the board members representing the state, 70% adopt this view and only 8% 
disagree/strongly disagree with this statement as (Figures 3and 4). 
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Figure 5-3: EBS and the Right Board Size 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-3) illustrates the percentage of respondents of EBS on whether the board is 
close to the right size for us to work together effectively. The EBS responded:  8% disagree, 22% 
neutral, 42% agree, and 28% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-4: EBP, FBP and the Right Board Size 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-4) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board is close to the right size for us to work together effectively. The EBP responded as: 8.7% 
strongly disagree, 21.7% disagree, 34.8 % agree, 34.8% strongly agree whereas FBP responded 
as 7.4% strongly disagree, 48.1% disagree, 11.1% neutral, and 33.3% agree. 
Although there is no existence of independent or outside directors in the Oil and Gas state Joint 
ventures, some have answered with agree/strongly agree to whether the number of independent 
directors is enough or not which might indicate a slight deficiency in understanding the concept 
of corporate governance fully as Figure 5 and 6 show . 
It was found that 59% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that 
there is sufficient number of independent directors on board, while 48% agree. As for the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 30% approve, while 8% want to see 
more of this. As for the board members representing the state, around half of them adopt this 
view and 24% does not back up this statement. 
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Figure 5-5: EBS and the number of the Independent Directors 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-5) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the number of 
independent directors on the board is sufficient to ensure the Board's independence. EBS 
responded in the following manner: 4% strongly disagree, 20% disagree, 30% neutral, 34% 
agree, and 12% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-6: EBP, FBP and the number of the Independent Directors 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
Figure (5-6) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
number of independent directors on the board is sufficient to ensure the Board's independence. 
The EBP responded as 8.7% strongly disagree, 34.8% neutral, 47.8% agree, and 8.7% strongly 
agree whereas FBP responded as: 40.7% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 14.8% neutral, and 
25.9 % agree. 
 
41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the rotation of the board 
members happen at an appropriate rate while only 25 %agree/ strongly agree. As for the Egyptian 
board members representing the private partner, 70% adopt this view and 17% sees the opposite. 
As for the board members representing the state, 46% agree/ strongly agree and only 30% 
disagree/ strongly agree (Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
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Figure 5-7: EBS and Board Rotation 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
As figure (5-7) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members 
rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the board. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 30% disagree, 24% neutral, 34% agree, and 12% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-8: EBP, FBP and Board Rotation 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-8) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board 
members rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the Board. The EBP responded as: 
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17.4 % disagree, 13% neutral, 60.9% agree, and 8.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 
3.7% strongly disagree, 37% disagree, 33.3% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree. 
2- Director roles and accountabilities. 
Board members are considered as the fiduciaries to navigate the ship/company towards the future 
of sustainability and one of the responsibilities of the chairman of the board is to define in a clear 
way the roles and responsibilities of each and every board member so every member get to know 
where his authority starts and where the other’s begins. 
The foreign board members feel that the two real barriers that hinder the defining of the 
responsibilities and duties of the board members are the vague understanding of the board’s roles 
as well as their way in resolving conflicts of interests. 
 
Director Roles and accountabilities: 
The study shows that 41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner do not 
see that there is clear understanding of all other board member’s roles and responsibilities, while 
29% approve. As for the EGY board members representing the private partner, 52% 
agree/strongly agree and 30% disapprove. As for the EGY board members representing the state, 
78% are content and 14% see the opposite (Figure 9 and 10). 
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Figure 5-9: EBS and Understanding Roles 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
As figure (5-9) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members 
have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other board members. EBS 
responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 8% neutral, 60% agree, and 18% strongly 
agree. 
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Figure 5-10: EBP, FBP and Understanding Roles 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Figure (5-10) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board 
members have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other Board members. 
The EBP responded as 4.3% strongly disagree, 26.1% disagree, 17.4% neutral, 30.4% agree, and 
21.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 11.1% strongly disagree, 29.6% disagree, 
29.6% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 11.1% strongly agree. 
44% of the foreign members representing the private partner disagree with the ability of the board 
to deal with conflicts of interests in a well-manner, while 11 % feel pleased with their board’s 
ability in dealing with conflicts. As for the EGY board members representing the private partner, 
26% supports the view and 22% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 28% 
are satisfied with the performance whereas 36% see the opposite (Figure 11 and 12). 
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Figure 5-11: EBS and Conflicts of Interests 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-11) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board 
handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from discussion 
or voting). EBS responded in the following manner: 4% strongly disagree, 32% disagree, 36% 
neutral, 18% agree, and 10% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-12: EBP, FBP and Conflicts of Interests 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-12) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the board 
handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from discussion 
or voting). The EBP responded as 4.3% strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 52.2% neutral, 17.4% 
agree, and 8.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 22.2% strongly disagree, 22.2% 
disagree, 44.4% neutral, 3.7% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree. 
3- Board structure, processes, and protocols. 
Boards establish committees to operate in an efficient way and get the work related to 
governance done. It has the ability to decrease the rate of problems springing from conflicts of 
interests of some board members.  
The formation of board committees is important for the efficient operation of the board as well as 
for the reduction of any problems resulting from the rise of any conflicts of interests. Many well-
known governance codes recommended the formation of three committees (nomination, audit, 
and remuneration), although the remuneration and nomination committees are sometimes 
combined into one (GCC, 2009). The average number of committees in Europe: United 
Kingdom is 3.8, France is 3 while 3.5 in Germany. In the Egyptian state-owned JV boards in the 
Oil and Gas Sector, separate committees are not prevalent within board. 
According to survey foreign board respondents, to create a value, preparation of the board 
materials and engagement actively in discussions should be improved. Improvements need to be 
done in the organizational as well as strategic information in specific as interviewees clarified. 
The role of the chairman needs also to be strengthened so that to increase the engagement of 
board members in discussions and to improve the quality of information. 
 
Roles and responsibilities of Board committees: 
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41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner reject that all board members 
understand the roles and duties of board committees (Although no establishment of any 
committees within any board is there) while 33 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members 
representing the private partner, 70% are supporting that, while 9% disapprove. As for the board 
members representing the state, 66% adopt this view and 16% see the opposite (Figure 13 and 
14).  
 
Figure 5-13: EBS and Awareness of Committees’ Roles 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-13) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether All Board 
members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees. The EBS 
responded in the following manner: 12% disagree, 14% neutral, 62% agree, and 12% strongly 
agree. 
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Figure 5-14: EPB, FBP and Awareness of Committees’ Roles 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
  
Figure (5-14) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether All 
Board members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees. The EBP 
responded as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 21.7% neutral, 43.5% agree, and 26.1% 
strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 25.9% strongly disagree, 14.8% disagree, 25.9% 
neutral, and 33.3% agree. 
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner agree/strongly agree that the 
board has an audit committee and consist of mainly independent directors, while 70 % approve. 
As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 29.6% approve and 52% 
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 26% adopt this view and 32% see 
the opposite. Though there are no existence of outside directors on the boards surveyed as I have 
mentioned earlier,  some answered the question with agree/strongly agree though which indicates 
that the term of independent directors are not familiar or common within this sector (Figure 15 
and 16). 
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Figure 5-15: EBS and Audit Committee 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-15) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board has an 
audit committee with a majority of independent board members. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 4% strongly disagree, 28% disagree, 42% neutral, 22% agree, and 4% strongly agree. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-16: EBP, FBP and Audit Committee 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-16) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board has an audit committee with a majority of independent members. The EBP responded as: 
13% strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 52.2 % agree, and 17.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP 
responded as: 44.4% strongly disagree, 7.4% disagree, 18.5% neutral, 14.8% agree, and 14.8% 
strongly agree. 
Board processes and protocols: 
4% of the foreign board members representing the private partner don’t agree/strongly agree 
with the fact that the board is allowed an access to information in a timely fashion, while 32 % 
approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 59% agree/ 
strongly agree and 41% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 96% agree/ 
strongly (Figure 17 and 18). 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17: EBS and Information Received 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-17) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on the Board has access to 
adequate, relevant, and timely information. EBS responded in the following manner: 4% neutral, 
54% agree, and 42% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-18: EBP, FBP and Information Received 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Figure (5-18) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board has access to adequate, relevant, and timely information. The EBP responded as: 4.3 % 
disagree, 13% neutral, and 82.6% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree, 
33.3% disagree, 25.9% neutral, and 33.3% agree. 
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner do not see that the meeting 
agenda and related materials are sent prior to the meeting, while 25 % approve that all materials 
are sent in the right time. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 
83% agree and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 92% support 
this (Figure 19 and 20). 
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Figure 5-19: EBS and Materials 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-19) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the materials for 
the Board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 8% neutral, 50% agree, and 42% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-20: EBP, FBP and Materials 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-20) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
materials for the board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting. The EBP responded 
as: 4.3 % disagree, 13 % neutral, 56.5% agree, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP 
responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 40.7% disagree, 29.6% neutral, and 25.9% agree. 
40.7% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly agree 
that the agenda of the board meeting brings the right topics to the front for discussion, while 
48.1 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 87% 
back up this and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 94% 
supports that (Figure 21 and 22). 
 
Figure 5-21: EBS and Meeting Agenda 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-21) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board 
meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion. The EBS responded in the following 
manner: 6% neutral, 52% agree, and 42% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-22: EBP, FBP and Meeting Agenda 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Figure (5-22) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
Board meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion. The EBP responded as: 4.3% 
disagree, 8.7% neutral, 43.5% agree, and 43.5% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 
7.4% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, 11.1 % neutral, 33.3% agree, and 14.8% strongly agree. 
44%  of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly disagree 
with the fact that the board meetings materials tackles the items for discussions in an effective 
manner, while 44 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private 
partner, 74% back up and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 
90% adopt this view (Figure 23 and 24). 
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Figure 5-23: EBS and Addressing Topics Effectively 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-23) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the materials 
prepared for board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion. EBS responded in the 
following manner: 10% neutral, 66% agree, and 24% strongly agree. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-24: EBP, FBP and Addressing Topics 
Effectively 
 
 Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-24) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
materials prepared for Board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion. The EBP 
responded as: 4.3 % disagree, 21.7% neutral, 60.9% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas 
FBP responded as:  11.1% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, 11.1% neutral, 40.7% agree, and 
3.7% strongly agree. 
40.7% of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not support the fact 
that materials are could be read and understood easily, whereas 44.4% approve. As for the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 83% agree/strongly agree and 13% 
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 84% adopt this view and 2% see 
the opposite (Figure 25 and 26). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-25: EBS and Preparation Materials 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-25) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether preparation 
materials are concise and easy to read and understand. EBS responded in the following manner: 
2% disagree, 14% neutral, 50% agree, and 34% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-26: EBP, FBP and Preparation Materials 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-26) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether 
Preparation materials are concise and easy to read and understand. The EBP responded as: 8.7% 
strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 4.3% neutral, 47.8% agree, and 34.8% strongly agree, whereas 
FBP responded as 22.2% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 14.8% neutral, 40.7% agree, and 
3.7% strongly agree. 
 
4- Delivery on Roles of the board: 
Three major obligations of the board were highlighted:  the formulation and reviewing of the 
strategic plan, supervision of health and performance, and dealing with major risks factors 
encountering the organization. 
According to the foreign board members surveyed, board members need to spend enough time 
on talent, risk, and strategy management as well as improving the quality of discussions on those 
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areas. The interviewees have expressed their dissatisfaction with the formulation of the strategy 
in a clear way. A retreat in this case could be the best solution for brainstorming and developing 
a suitable vision and strategy for the company. A talent management expertise should be invited 
to the board starting the selection process to the retention one. This could be done through 
offering training courses as well as frequent reading benchmarks, analyst reports, and 
management periodicals to develop the capabilities of the board members (GCC, 2009). 
 
Strategy:  
52% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the fact that 
board members devote more quality time for defining and reviewing strategy, while 33 % 
approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 35% back up 
this and 17% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 33% adopt this 
view (Figure 27 and 28). 
 
Figure 5-27: EBS and Involvement in Strategy Development 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-27) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether Board members 
are sufficiently involved in strategy development. EBS responded in the following manner: 34% 
neutral, 46% agree, and 20% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-28: EBP, FBP and Involvement in Strategy Development 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-28) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether Board 
members are sufficiently involved in strategy development. The EBP responded as: 17.4 % 
disagree, 21.7% neutral, 34.8% agree, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 
18.5% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, and 14.8% neutral, 33.3% agree. 
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not feel that the board 
dedicate a sufficient amount of time on discussing important issues related to strategy, whereas 
29% approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 43% approve 
of that and 22% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 35% agree/strongly 
agree and 8% disagree/ strongly disagree (Figure 29 and 30). 
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Figure 5-29: EBS and Time discussing Strategy Issues 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-29) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members 
spend enough time discussing strategy issues. EBS responded in the following manner: 8% 
disagree, 22% neutral, 48% agree, and 22% strongly agree. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-30: EBP, FBP and Time discussing Strategy Issues 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-30) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board 
members spend enough time discussing strategy issues. The EBP responded as: 21.7 % disagree, 
34.8% neutral, 30.4% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as 3.7% strongly 
disagree, 40.7% disagree, 25.9% neutral, 25.9% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree. 
Performance management: 
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all board 
members understand how well the company is operating, while 18 % approve. As for the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 70% approve and 9% disapprove. As 
for the board members representing the state, 90% back up this (Figure 31 and 32). 
 
Figure 5-31: EBS and Understanding of the Org. performance 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-31) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board has a 
real understanding of how well the organization is performing. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 10% neutral, 62% agree, and 28% strongly agree. 
 
88 
 
Figure 5-32: EBP, FBP and Understanding of the Org. performance 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Figure (5-32) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board has a real understanding of how well the organization is performing. The EBP responded 
as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 21.7% neutral, 39.1% agree, and 30.4% strongly 
agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 55.6% neutral, and 
18.5% agree. 
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly disagree 
with the fact that the Board pays attention to a set of health indicators e.g. the rate of employee 
attrition, while 41% approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private 
partner, 65% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 54% 
support this and 14% see the opposite (Figure 33 and 34). 
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Figure 5-33: EBS and Tracking of Health Indicators 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-33) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is tracking a 
set of health indicators (e.g., employees’ attrition rate, customer satisfaction, new products share 
of revenue). EBS responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 32% neutral, 32% agree, 
and 22% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-34: EBP, FBP and Tracking of Health Indicators 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-34) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
Board is tracking a set of health indicators (e.g., employees attrition rate, customer satisfaction, 
new products share of revenue).The EBP responded as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 21.7% disagree, 
8.7% neutral, and 65.2% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 29.6% 
disagree, 25.9% neutral, 37% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree. 
Attitudes toward company performance issues: 
22% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disapprove of the elimination 
of jobs to increase profitability, while 52% approve. As for the Egyptian board members 
representing the private partner, 52% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members 
representing the state, 32% adopt this view and 48% see the opposite (Figure 35 and 36). 
 
Figure 5-35: EBS and Job Elimination 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-35) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether it is appropriate 
to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability. EBS responded in 
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the following manner: 2% strongly disagree, 30% disagree, 20% neutral, 40% agree, and 8% 
strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-36: EBP, FBP and Job Elimination 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-36) shows percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether it is 
appropriate to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability. The EBP 
responded as: 26.1% strongly disagree, 13% disagree, 43.5% agree, and 17.4% strongly agree, 
whereas FBP responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 7.4% disagree, 22.2% neutral, 40.7%agree, 
and 25.9% strongly agree. 
Talent management: 
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree, while 25% 
approve of the fact that board members are all involved in managing talents in an effective 
way (i.e., selecting talented members, compensating the talented, development and 
evaluating board members to discover skills and benefit from the talented). As for the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 47% back up and 26% 
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disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 78% adopt this view and 4% 
see the opposite (Figure 37and 38). 
 
 
Figure 5-37: EBS and Involvement in Talent Management 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-37) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is 
effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation, evaluation, 
development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management team). EBS 
responded in the following manner: 4% disagree, 18% neutral, 52% agree, and 26% strongly 
agree. 
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Figure 5-38: EBP, FBP and Involvement in Talent Management 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-38) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
Board is effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation, evaluation, 
development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management team).The 
EBP responded as: 26.1% disagree, 26.1% neutral, and 47.8% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 
7.4% strongly disagree, 25.9% disagree, 40.7% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree. 
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that the board spends 
enough time on talent management, while 29 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members 
representing the private partner, 43% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members 
representing the state, 22% adopt this view and 22% see the opposite (Figure 39and 40). 
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Figure 5-39: EBS and Discussions of Talent Management 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-39) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board spends 
sufficient time discussing talent management issues. EBS responded in the following manner: 
4% strongly disagree, 18% disagree, 56% neutral, 20% agree, and 2% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-40: EBP, FBP and Discussions of Talent Management 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (40) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board spends sufficient time discussing talent management issues. The EBP responded as: 26.1 
% disagree, 30.4% neutral, 26.1% agree, and 17.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 
3.7% strongly disagree, 29.6% disagree, 37% neutral, and 29.6% agree. 
37% of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied with the process 
of documentation for succession plans of critical job positions, while 25% approve. As for the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 26% are satisfied and 44% disapprove. 
As for the board members representing the state, 40% are content and 36% see the opposite (Figure 
41and 42). 
Figure 5-41: EBS and Succession Plans 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-41) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board has a 
documented process of succession plans for all critical positions. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 4% strongly disagree, 32% disagree, 24% neutral, 38% agree, and 2% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-42: EBP, FBP and Succession Plans 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-42) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
Board has a documented process of succession plans for all critical positions. The EBP 
responded as: 43.5 % disagree, 30.4% neutral, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP 
responded as: 37 % disagree, 37% neutral, and 25.9% agree. 
5- Effective dynamics: 
Board dynamics include: adequate preparation for board meetings, being effectively 
engaged in discussions and know the purpose of them. 
The foreign board members expressed their dissatisfaction with how conflicts are resolved. 
To solve that the board members should know that they are a team “and can take advantage 
of much of the research available on the drivers of team effectiveness. Taking the time to 
openly discuss the board’s performance as a team, working on building better personal 
connections and shared understanding between board members and, more broadly, finding a 
style and rhythm of interactions that suits the individuals involved can all contribute to 
better dynamics in the board room. The board has a vital role and substantial fiduciary duty 
to perform — but that need not detract from it functioning as a well performing team where 
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members are genuinely stimulated and excited by their roles and interactions with each 
other” (GCC, 2009:27). 
Preparation and participation: 
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disapprove of the 
fact that all board members prepare right for meetings, while 29 % approve. As for 
the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 83% back up and 29% 
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 70% adopt this view and 
6% see the opposite (Figure 43and 44). 
Figure 5-43: EBS and Preparation for Meetings 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-43) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether all board 
members prepare well for board meetings. EBS responded in the following manner: 6% disagree, 
24% neutral, 54% agree, and 16% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-44: EBP, FBP and Preparation for Meetings 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-44) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether all 
Board members prepare well for Board meetings. The EBP responded as: 13 % disagree, 4.3 % 
neutral, and 82.6 % agree, whereas FBP responded as: 44.4 % disagree, 25.9% neutral, and 
29.6% agree. 
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all board 
members are involved in debates and discussions in meetings, while 37 % approve. As for 
the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 60% back up and 17% 
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 94% adopt this view and 2% 
see the opposite (Figure 45 and 46) 
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Figure 5-45: EBS and Engagement in Board Discussions 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-45) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether all board 
members are engaged in board discussions. EBS responded in the following manner: 2% 
disagree, 4% neutral, 74% agree, and 20% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-46: EBP, FBP and Engagement in Board Discussions 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-46) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether all 
board members are engaged in board discussions. The EBP responded as: 17.4 % disagree, 
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21.7% neutral, 39.1% agree, and 21.7% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 3.7% 
strongly disagree, 40.7% disagree, 18.5% neutral, and 37% agree. 
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all members are 
aware of the purpose of discussions running in meetings, while 37% approve. As for the Egyptian 
board members representing the private partner, 87% back up and 9% disapprove. As for the board 
members representing the state, 82% adopt this view and 4% see the opposite (Figure 47and 48). 
 
 
Figure 5-47: EBS and Purpose of Discussions 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-47) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members 
are always clear on the purpose of their discussions. EBS responded in the following manner: 4% 
disagree, 14% neutral, 62% agree, and 20% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-48: EBP, FBP and Purpose of Discussions 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-48) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board 
members are always clear on the purpose of their discussions. The EBP responded as: 8.7 % 
disagree, 4.3% neutral, 73.9% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 29.6% 
disagree, 33.3% neutral, and 37% agree. 
Challenge and conflicts: 
52% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that the board is 
able to reach closure on issues that are difficult, while 22 % approve. As for the Egyptian 
board members representing the private partner, 48% back up. As for the board members 
representing the state, 66% adopt this view and 4% see the opposite (Figure 49 and 50). 
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Figure 5-49: EBS and Reaching Closure 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-49) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is able to 
reach closure on difficult decisions. EBS responded in the following manner: 4% disagree, 30% 
neutral, 50% agree, and 16% strongly agree. 
Figure 5-50: EBP, FBP and Reaching Closure 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5-50) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
board is able to reach closure on difficult decisions. The EBP responded as: 52.2 % neutral, 
43.5% agree, and 4.3 % strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree, 
14.8% disagree, 25.9% neutral, and 51.9% agree. 
6- Overall effectiveness and renewal: 
According to the foreign board members interviewed, an evaluation should be conducted; it 
should assess the board’s performance as a whole as well as the directors individually. In terms 
of mechanics, the evaluation process can be delivered by self-assessments, external assessments 
or a combination of the two. Self-assessments, which involve the board reviewing itself against 
certain criteria, are easier to implement and less threatening than assessments by outsiders, thus 
making directors more likely to accept the evaluation process. However, some disadvantages 
include subjective responses, the potential unwillingness of some board members to honestly 
review the work of their tenured peers, and the prospect of outsiders discounting the final 
assessment as less than impartial. Formal assessments involve a board review by an independent 
third party. One benefit of a formal assessment is the likelihood that it will be viewed as 
impartial. The disadvantages are that the process is more complicated, more time is needed, and 
directors are more likely to feel threatened than under a self-assessment” (GCC, 2009: 29). The 
board members are the one to decide which type of evaluation to take depending on the trust as 
well as the openness level prevalent among the board. 
The study shows that there were differences in opinions towards board renewal as the following 
points illustrate: 
Board renewal: 
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30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner opine that the board takes 
time to form an opinion about and discuss existing challenges encountering the organization 
and the available opportunities for improvements, while 52% approve. As for the Egyptian 
board members representing the private partner, 52% back up and 17% disapprove. As for 
the board members representing the state, 64% adopt this view and 14% see the opposite 
(Figure 51 and 52). 
 
 
Figure 5-51: EBS and Time Taken for Reflection on Issues 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-51) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board takes 
the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges and opportunities 
for improvement are. EBS responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 22% neutral, 54% 
agree, and 10% strongly agree. 
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Figure 5-52: EBP, FBP and Time Taken for Reflection on Issues 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-52) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the 
Board takes the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges and 
opportunities for improvement are. The EBP responded as: 17.4 % disagree, 30.4% neutral, and 
52.2% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 29.6 % disagree, 18.5% neutral, and 51.9% agree. 
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the fact that there is 
flexibility of the board in matters of reprioritizing important issues that necessitates quick 
intervention, while 63 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private 
partner, 100% back up. As for the board members representing the state, 80% adopt this view and 
10% see the opposite as seen in Figure (52 and 53). 
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Figure 5-53: EBS and Flexibility 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
Figure (5-53) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board is 
flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it. EBS responded in the following 
manner: 10% disagree, 10% neutral, 70% agree, and 10% strongly agree. 
 
Figure 5-54: EBP, FBP and Flexibility 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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Figure (5- 54) shows percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the board 
is flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it. The EBP responded as: 69.6 % 
agree, and 30.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 25.9% disagree, 11.1% neutral, 
59.3% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree. 
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Chapter 6 : Study Findings 
 
This chapter sums up the key findings based on the survey results of the quantitative analysis 
employed in the study. The study also intended to find a correlation between differences towards 
the practices of governance, experience (in terms of number of boards that members served on), 
and education, but the results were insignificant and we are limited by both space and time.  The 
analysis discussed in the previous chapter has revealed that differences towards governance 
practices do exist between local- Egyptian board members who represent the state as an owner, 
Egyptians representing the private partner, and foreign board members or IJV boards as they will 
be discussed in this chapter. No significant difference is found between Egyptians board 
members representing the private partner and those members representing the state on board. The 
striking contrast is found in the six “levers” (GCC Board Effectiveness and Governance Survey, 
2009: 10) as shown in the chapter of the analysis between the foreign board members, and those 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner as well as the state.  
The results of the questionnaire shows that nearly half of foreign board members who are 
representing the private partner are not satisfied with the board composition and the capabilities 
of the directors which is considered an important factor in achieving board effectiveness.  
Whereas more or less quarter of the Egyptian board members representing the private partner 
and of those representing the state feel the contrary. An American board member when 
interviewed says that in order for the board to be effective “The board should be aware of the 
latest trends of international board practices and applying them in the right manner. The board 
should consist of a mix of directors with more knowledge and expertise so that to manage well 
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the challenges we encounter” while an Indian board member said that “bringing an expertise in 
financial stewardship is needed”.  Egyptian private board member mentioned that “the directors 
should reach a high degree of creativity to enable them to develop the organization. They need to 
be more professionals, and efficient...” two Egyptian state board member say also “The board 
members should be selected based on a fair criteria – their experiences and expertise- not 
through favoritism, cronyism,  or nepotism. That people with experience, and efficiency should 
be rewarded for motivation so that our board could achieve an effective performance”. Another 
state board member say “The secretary of the board should have the necessary expertise  ...Have 
the quality of integrity and honesty not manipulating the situation for his/her own interests”.  
According to the members surveyed as illustrated, more or less half of the foreign board 
members representing the private partner want to see more of understanding of the duties of all 
the rest of board members, while only quarter of the Egyptian board members representing the 
private partner disagree. As for the board members representing the state, they agree that there is 
an accurate understanding of the duties of the board but quarter of them view that the board is 
incapable of dealing with conflicts of interests in the right way. A Canadian board member 
mentioned that “there should be an orientation program to introduce them to the responsibilities 
and duties they will be holding” 
The research shows a lack of independent directors though their presence will add a lot of value 
in the board. 
Nearly half of the Egyptian board members representing the private partner disagree that the 
board is allowed an access to information in the right time, whereas the foreign board members 
representing the private partner and the board members representing the state agree to this. As 
for the agenda and materials preparation given to board, almost half of the foreign board 
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members representing the private partner disagree while the majority of the Egyptian board 
members representing the private partner and the board members representing the state agree. 
The quality of information received by the board and, the preparation for and engagement level 
in meetings need be improved to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the board. An 
Egyptian Private board member says “training programs in management, governance and 
presentation skills should be devised for the board to improve their performance”. 
More or less half of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied 
with the strategy formulation or the discussion about strategy. Whereas more than quarter of the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner as well as the board members 
representing the state are content. 
Nearly quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied 
with the management of performance in terms of understanding organization performance and 
how well it is, as well as of the tracing of health indicators, whereas the majority of the Egyptian 
board members representing the private partner and the board members representing the state are 
satisfied with the performance in general. 
Around half of the foreign board members and the Egyptian board members representing the 
private partner agree to eliminate jobs if it was necessary while only quarter of the board 
members representing the state reject that. 
Around quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree with the 
way board is handling talent management, whereas the Egyptian board members representing the 
private partner are satisfied except in the process of plans documentation regarding succession 
ones for important position. The majority of the board members representing the state feel that 
there is nothing wrong with talent management. 
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Hence there is a need to dedicate more time to strategy, performance, talent, and risk 
management. An Indian board member say that “the board needs to develop the key performance 
indicators and financial objectives”. Another one say “There should  be an up-to-date internal 
system  with rules and laws to regulate the inner workings of the board e.g. voting system , 
holding and scheduling of meetings, etc.. which will help board members in making sound 
decisions”.  An Egyptian board member added that “There should be a sound plan for board 
members succession to prepare a new generation or second row of new leaders by devising a 
leadership development program.  Evaluation of the board’s and top managers’ performance 
should be conducted from time to time so the weaknesses and strengths could be detected”. 
Half of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not support the 
statement that says the board is capable to take decisions regarding difficult issue, while only 
quarter approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, around half 
of them think the board has the ability to do so. As for the board members representing the state, 
more than half agree. 
Around quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree with the 
way the board is dealing with opportunities and challenges when needed as well as disapprove 
with the board being inflexible in facing any critical situations when appear, whereas the 
Egyptian board members representing the private partner and the board members representing 
the state are satisfied. 
Other challenges regarding decision-making are tackled during the interviews. One of the 
Egyptian board member who represents the state as an owner says that “the foreign member has 
the upper hand and the board members have no say in anything and this out of fear from the 
fleeing of investments….The foreign partner is cuddled especially after the law stipulated that 
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the shares should be 50/ 50. Now the foreign partner is poking his nose in everything even in the 
affairs or issues that relates to the Egyptian employees in terms of promotions, remuneration, and 
bonuses, though whatever he pays, the EGPC pay him back later. The foreign partner gives 
himself the green light to delay any agreed drilling plans in the budget) to the next year without 
any penalties in some cases  under the plea of force majeure, the decrease in the price of oil, or 
lack of financial liquidity and that’s against the plans set by the government”. Another one 
mentioned that “The partners or shareholders should be flexible in financing the necessary work 
activities”. 
 
 Here we will look into the findings of the GCC Board Directors Institute’s (BDI) reports 
in 2009, 2011, and 2013 on the publicly-listed companies in GCC countries. The first 
report in 2009 covered the 200 top companies where more than 100 board members have 
completed the survey. In the second report of 2011, 200 board members have participated 
while in 2013, there is no mention of the sample number. Findings are as follow: 
 In 2009: 
1- Board composition and capabilities of directors need to be improved.  
2- A good amount of time need to be devoted by the board members to their duties and 
roles. 
3- There is a substantial lack of international expertise on the GCC boards. As for the 
presence of Independent directors from outside the region, they represent less than 3 %. 
4- It was found that there is a very limited use of specialized committees (i.e. audit 
remuneration, and nomination) in the GCC region. 
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5- More time is needed to be devoted to their core board roles in terms of strategy, risk, and 
talent management. 
6- Board dynamics need to be improved in terms of the quality of information, preparation 
for meetings and the board’s engagement level during debates in the meetings. 
7- An evaluation process needs to be conducted. 
8- Executive committee is the one of the GCC boards’ used common practices, but the use 
of this committee is not effective to organizations with such productive performance and 
size. 
 
 In 2011: 
1- Improvement of the board composition and capabilities of the directors still represent a 
barrier to board effectiveness. 
2- International expertise is still missing. 
3- GCC board specialized committees ( audit, remuneration , and nomination as mentioned 
in the report recommendations) doubled in number more than they used to be in 2009 
4- The number of the independent directors has also increased. 
5- The boards still need to devote more time to their roles and responsibilities, risk, strategy, 
and talent management. 
6- Executive committees are still in use and increased. 
7- Preparation for meetings and engagement in discussions are still a barrier. 
8- Self- evaluation is still missing. 
 
 In 2013: 
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1- More awareness of the GCC board members of their duties and roles is recognized in 
terms of the internal board processes, enforcing accountability and corporate governance. 
2- No development happened in the board composition and the skills of the board. 
3- More time is still needed for strategy management. 
4- Board members are not rotating at a speedy rate so that to bring new spirits into the 
board. This is due to the close ties existing between family and business.  
5- A striking rise in the numbers of board members who approves that the participation of 
the board members becomes more active at the board meetings. 
6- Talent management is still missing and no succession plans for critical positions is made. 
7- No evaluation process. 
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Chapter 7 : Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The study reveals that there are several differences in the perspectives of board members towards 
corporate governance practices which in turn could influence board effectiveness in a negative 
way. Hence, there are some actions that the boards of the oil and gas state joint ventures in Egypt 
should consider: 
1- Nomination and appointment process: 
In nominating new board candidates, seeking sector-specific talents is an excellent way to 
manage to build a strong board that an organization grows into (Ward, 2012). The selected 
director should possess a mix of skills, knowledge, and experiences-e.g. governance, thinking in 
a strategic way...etc.-, though this is not enough to produce a perfect profile of a board. A 
diversity in the board composition should exist in terms of gender, age, and professional practice. 
In a nutshell there is no fixed formula to reach an ideal board. Therefore, before nomination, it is 
advised to go over the sector’s strategy and the board’s job description so as to link between 
goals, priorities, and competencies aimed for, in order to determine what experience in which 
area is mostly needed (MIoD, 2012). 
2- Size of the board: 
The issue of the ideal size of the board is very debatable. There is no one-fits-all size for this 
because every organization has its own demands and needs. It depends on the structure of 
governance, regulatory requirements, as well as which stage of growth the organization in. the 
average and recommended size is from 10 to 12 board members (Ward, 2012). Few points 
should be taken into consideration upon deciding to set out the board size: discussions going on 
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the board room is constructive and fruitful, the board consists of independent directors (one third 
of the board would be ideal), the number of members is sufficient to make the work flow going 
faster, the quorum size is enough to take quick decisions in important matter, the composition of 
board committees consists of and headed mainly by independent directors, and there is a separate 
chairman and CEO (MIoD, 2012). 
3- Recruitment of independent board members:  
Having independent board members is very important. First to avoid that no one dominate the 
process of decision-making, as the allegiance to the chairman could lead to an atmosphere that 
stifles discussion and debate. Second to reflect the big picture so that to prevent by that this false 
report of “everything is going just fine”.  
4- Women on board seats:  
Women are scarcely found in the boardroom, which means there is no diversity of gender, 
thought, or experience. 
5- Bringing international expertise into the boardroom:  
The focus should be on attracting board members with best international practice experience. 
6- Establishment of board committees ( audit, nomination, and evaluation) to avoid 
any rise of conflicts of interests in those areas:  
For example an audit committee should be created with a majority of independent directors. Its 
duty is to supervise the practices and activities of management in crucial governance domains 
e.g. values, morals and ethics, annual reports, plans set by management, risk management, 
financial statements, and structure of governance. This will increase transparency of the public 
sector in those above mentioned areas (IIAs, 2014). Although the legislation puts the power of 
117 
 
nominating new board members in the hands of the minister solely, a nominating committee 
could also be established so it can be involved in the process of nomination by setting the criteria 
for selecting ideal board candidates. It is also responsible for designing continuing education 
programs for new directors to enhance their skills. It creates orientation programs for new 
directors so as to be familiar with the organization’s strategy and challenges it is encountering. 
Establishing evaluation committee is also recommended so as to evaluate the performance of the 
organization- in terms of its mission, targets and goals-, the chairman and board of directors as 
well as of the work of other committees on a yearly basis and identify strengths and weaknesses 
suggesting areas of improvements. Then coming up with recommendations in adherence with the 
policies and requirements of the sector. After the creation of those committees, a well- defined 
job description and a work plan for each committee should be set upfront so that each committee 
and every board member know clearly their exact responsibilities and duties.  
7- The materials for the meetings of the board:  
The chairman, with the assistance of the management, should draft the agenda and materials for 
every meeting. Materials should be sent out in advance of holding the meeting. Time should be 
devoted to the items on the meeting agenda according to their value. The presenter should not 
keep repeating what the board already read rather it should add to what is already mentioned for 
not wasting time. Last- minute issues could be briefly discussed over the phone so that to make 
sure everyone knows what is going to happen in the meeting and becomes actively engage in 
discussions (Ward, 2012). 
8- Handling of conflicts of interests: 
Any board member with conflict of interests should abstain from voting, though this seems very 
utopian (Ward, 2012). 
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9- Devote appropriate time to risk oversight, talent and strategy management:  
This will reflect on the ability of the board to engage actively on key issues in those areas. 
 
10- The merit-based system need to be amended. 
It should be based on the candidates’ abilities and experiences. 
 
Hence, the study reveals several dimensions that could be a fertile soil for growing conflicts in 
the future resulting from differences in the perspectives towards the corporate governance 
practices in the oil and gas state joint-ventures in Egypt between the foreign board members 
representing, the private partner, the Egyptian board members representing the private partners, 
and the state board members. It gives insights for policy makers and board of directors on how to 
overcome such barriers. Future researches may examine the issue on a bigger scale. 
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APPENDIX 1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC 
BUSINESS SECTORS: 
Sector Public Sector Public Business Sector 
Structure Public Sector Authorities Public Sector Companies Holding Companies Subsidiary Companies 
Law Law no. 97/1983 which is 
amended by law no. 
109/87 
Public sector companies 
are 
subject to: 
− Law no. 97/1983 which is 
amended by law no. 
109/87 
− law no. 159/1981 where 
no 
specific provision of law no. 
97/1983 is provided 
Holding companies are 
subject 
to: 
− Law no. 203/1991, and 
− law no. 159/1981 where 
no 
specific provision of law no. 
203/1991 is provided 
Subsidiary companies are 
subject to: 
− Law no. 203/1991, and 
− law no. 159/1981 where 
no 
specific provision of law 
203/1991 is provided 
Legal Status an independent entity 
under the 
General Law 
Joint stock company Holding companies take the 
form of joint stock 
companies 
and are considered as one of 
special law persons 
Joint stock company 
Supervision Competent Minister 
specified in 
its establishment 
presidential 
decree 
Public sector authorities Competent Minister 
specified by 
a presidential decree 
Holding companies 
Management Board of directors 
appointed 
upon a presidential decree 
and 
proposed by the 
competent 
minister for four years 
Board of directors consists 
of: 
− a chairman nominated by 
the 
competent Minister and 
appointed by a decree 
issued 
by the Prime Minister 
− members appointed by 
the 
competent minister 
represent 
a) 50% of total members if 
the company is fully owned 
by public entities; or b) the 
same proportion of public 
entities share in the capital 
− members representing 
private 
individuals proportionate 
to their share in the capital 
− other members are 
elected 
among employees 
according 
to law no 73/1973 
Board of directors is formed 
by 
a resolution of the general 
assembly upon a proposal by 
the 
company chairman for three 
years which are renewable 
and 
consists of an odd number of 
members not less than seven 
and 
not more than seven as 
follows: 
− a full-time chairman 
− a number of members not 
less 
than five selected from 
persons having experience in 
economic, financial, 
technical, legal and business 
administration fields 
− a representative of the 
Egyptian workers general 
federation of syndicate to be 
selected by the federation’s 
board of directors 
− a company whose capital is 
fully owned by a single or 
multiple holding companies, 
public entities or public 
sector 
banks is managed by a board 
of directors appointed for a 
renewable term of three 
years. 
This board consists of an odd 
number of directors not less 
than five and not more than 
nine including the board 
chairman as follows: a) a 
part-time 
chairman appointed by 
general assembly, b) a part-
time experienced members 
appointed by the holding 
company’s board of 
directors, 
c) a number of members 
equal 
to experienced members to 
be 
elected from employees 
according to law regulating 
this matter 
− chairman of the committee 
of 
syndicate who is not counted 
as a voting member 
Ownership funds of authorities owned 
by 
the state unless otherwise 
declared in its 
establishment 
decree 
A public sector company is 
any 
company either: a) owned 
by a 
public entity alone or in 
participation with other 
The capital of holding 
companies is fully owned by 
the 
state or public judicial 
persons 
Holding companies must 
own at 
least 51% its capital 
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public 
entities and public sector 
banks 
or companies, or b) one or 
more 
of public entities 
participate with 
private individuals and 
public 
share of capital, including 
the 
share of public banks and 
companies, must be not 
less than 
51% of total capital. 
 
Source: (Ghoneim, 2005: 164) 
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APPENDIX 2 AFFILIATED COMPANIES OF HOLDING COMPANIES (EGAS, 
ECHEM, GANOPE) 
Affiliated companies of EGAS 
1. Rashid Petroleum Company (RASHPETCO) 
2. Burullus Gas Company (BURULLUS) 
3. El-Qantara Petroleum Company (QANTARA) 
4. El-Mansoura Petroleum Company (MANSOURA) 
5. Al-Rawda Petroleum Company (AL-RAWDA) 
6. El-Wastani Petroleum Company (WASCO) 
7. El-Manzalah Petroleum Company (El-MANZALA) 
8. West Qantara Petroleum Company (PETRO QANTARA) 
9. North Sinai Petroleum Company (NOSPCO) 
10. Pharos Petroleum Company (PHPC) 
11. North Bardawil Petroleum Company 
(PETROBARDAWIL) 
12. Thekah Petroleum Company (THEKAH) 
13. North Idku Petroleum Company (NIPETCO) 
14. Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO) 
15. Egyptian Town Gas (ETG) 
16. Egypt Gas 
17. TAQA Group: 
 REPCO Gas 
 Nile Valley Gas Company (NVGC) 
 City Gas Company TRANS Gas Company 
18. Fayum Gas Company 
19. National Gas S.A.E 
20. Sinai GAS 
21. Cairo Gas 
22. Regions Company (REGAS) 
23. Maya Gas 
24. Overseas gas 
25. Nubaria Gas Company 
26. Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO) 
27. United Gas Derivatives Company (UGDC) 
28. • Egyptian LNG (ELNG) 
29. • Spanish Egyptian Gas Company (SEGAS) 
30. • East Gas Company (EGC) 
31. • Natural Gas Vehicles Company (NGVC) 
32. • Egyptian International Gas Technology (GAS TEC) 
33. • Shell Compressed Natural Gas Egypt 
34. • Arabia Gas 
35. • Master Gas 
36. • Total Egypt 
37. • Sianco 
38. • Petroleum Trading Company (Petrotrade) 
39. • Egyptian Company for Gas Services (ECGS) 
 
Affiliated companies of ECHEM 
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1. Alexandria Specialty Petroleum Products Company (ASPPC) 
2. Egyptian Petrochemicals Company (EPC) 
3. Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Company (Sidpec) 
4. Egyptian Linear Alkyl Benzene Company (ELAB) 
5. Egyptian propylene and poly propylene company (EPPC) 
6. Egyptian Styrene and Polystyrene Company (Estyrenics) 
7. Misr oil processing & fertilizers Company (Mopco) 
8. Amreya Petroleum Refining Company (APRC) 
 
Affiliated companies of GANOPE 
1. Petrogulf Misr Company (Petrogulf ) 
2. Esh El Malaha Petroleum Company (Eshpetco) 
3. Magawish Petroleum Company (Magapetco) 
4. Gabal El Zeit Petroleum Company (Zeitco) 
5. Wady El Sahl Petroleum Company (Waspetco) 
6. Vegas Oil & Gas 
7. East Zeit Petroleum Company (Petrozeit) 
8. Assiut Petroleum Refining Co. 
9. Nile Petroleum Marketing Co. 
10. El Wadi El Gadid Co. for Mineral Resources and Oil Shale (WADI 
CO.) 
11. Wahet Paris for Natural Water Co. 
12. El Wadi El Gadeed for Packing Co. 
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APPENDIX 3 PUBLIC SECTOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES, OIL AND GAS 
JOINT VENTURES WITH STATE PARTICIPATION, INVESTMENT 
PETROLEUM COMPANIES, AND MULTI-NATIONAL PETROLEUM 
COMPANIES. 
Public Sector Petroleum companies 
1- General Petroleum Company 
2- Petroleum Pipelines Company 
3- Misr Petroleum Company 
4- Petroleum Cooperative Society Co. 
5- Petroleum Gases Company (PETROGAS) 
6- Suez Oil Processing Company (SOPC) 
7- El Nasr Petroleum Co. (NPC) 
8- Alexandria Petroleum Co. (APC) 
9- Amerya Petroleum Refining Co. (APRC) 
10- Egyptian Petrochemical Company (EPC) 
11- Assuit Oil Refining Company 
12- Cairo Oil Refining Co. 
 
Source:  Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas company 
Oil and Gas Joint Ventures with State Participation 
1- Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (GUPCO) 
2- Belayim Petroleum Co. (PETROBEL) 
3- Badr Petroleum Co. (BAPETCO) 
4- Agiba Petroleum Co. 
5- PETROGULF MISR Company 
6- Abu Qir Petroleum  
7- Western Desert Petroleum Company (WEPCO ) 
8- Alamein Petroleum Co. 
9- Petrosafe 
10- Gebel El Zeit Petroleum Company (Petrozeit ) 
11- Khalda Petroleum Co. 
12-   Rashid Petroleum Co. (RashPetco) 
13- Qarun Petroleum Co. (QPC) 
14- GEMSA Petroleum Company (GEMPETCO) 
15- East Zeit Petroleum Co. (ZEITCO) 
16- Oasis Petroleum Company (OAPCO) 
17- AL AMAL Petroleum Company (AMAPETCO) 
18- Offshore Shukheir Oil Company (OSOCO) 
19- Magawish Petroleum Co. (MAGAPETCO) 
20- Suez Oil Co.  (SUCO) 
21- Esh El Mallaha Petroleum Company (ESHPETCO)  
22- Wadi El Sahl Petroleum Company (WASPETCO) 
23- South Dabaa Petroleum Co. (DAPETCO ) 
24- Fanar Petroleum Company (FANPETCO) 
25- Gharib Oil Services Company 
26- PETRODARA  Co. 
27- El Mansoura Petroleum company 
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28- El Wastani Petroleum Company (WASCO) 
29- North Bahariya Petroleum Co. (NORPETCO) 
30- North Sinai Petroleum Company (NOSPCO ) 
31- West Bakr Petroleum Co. 
32- EL Hamra Oil Co. 
33- Marina Petroleum Company 
34- North Alamein Petroleum Company ( NALPETCO) 
35- Petro Amir  petroleum company 
36- Pharaonic Petroleum Company  (PHPC ) 
37- South Abu Zenima Petroleum Company (Petrozenima) 
38- PetroShahd Co. 
39- Petrosilah 
40- Petrosalam Company 
41- PetroSannan Company 
 
Source:  Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies 
 
Investment Petroleum companies 
1- Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co. (SUMED) 
2- The Petroleum Projects and Technical Consultations Company (PETROJET) 
3- Petroleum Air services (PAS) 
4- Engineering for the Petroleum & Process Industries (ENNPI) 
5- Egypt Gas 
6- Egyptian Drilling Company (EDC) 
7- Natural Gas Vehicles Co. (NGV) 
8- Egyptian International Gas Technology (GAS TEC) 
9- Petroleum Safety and Environmental services Company (Petrosafe) 
10- Egyptian Natural Gas Co. (GASCO) 
11- Egyptian Maintenance Company (EMC) 
12- Alexandria Petroleum Maintenance Company (PETROMAINT) 
13- Middle East Oil Refinery Company (MIDOR) 
14- Sidi Krir For Petrochemicals Co. (SIDPEC) 
15- Egyptian Petroleum Services Company (EPSCO) 
16- Alexandria Mineral Oils Co. (AMOC) 
17- Alexandria Co. For Petroleum Additives (ACPA) 
18- Misr Oil Processing Co. (MOPCO) 
19- Middle East Oil Tankage and Pipelines (MIDTAP) 
20- National Gas Company (NATGAS) 
21- Alexandria Specially Petroleum Products Co. (ASPPC) 
22- Alexandria National Refining and Petrochemicals Co. (ANRPC) 
23- The Egyptian Co. For Transporting and Connecting Gas (BUTAGASCO) 
24- National Gas (NG) 
25- Sianco 
26- Town Gas Company 
27- Petroleum Marine Services Co. (PMS) 
28- PETROMIN LUBRICATING OIL CO. (PETROLUB) 
29- Nile Valley Gas Company (EMEC) 
30- Oriental Petrochemicals Company (OPC) 
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31- City Gas Co. 
32- Repco Gas 
33- Petroleum Trading Service Company (Petro Trade) 
34- International Pipe Industry Co. (IPIC) 
35- East Gas Co. (EGC) 
36- Fayoum Gas Company 
37- Egyptian Projects Operation and maintenance (EPROM) 
38- Petrosport 
39- United Gas Derivatives Co. (UGDC) 
40- Egyptian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) 
41- Tharwa Co. 
42- Emarat Misr Petroleum Products Company (Emarat Misr) 
43- Arabia for Oil & Gas Lines (Altube) 
44- Egyptian Fajr For Natural Gas Co. (EFNG) 
45- Jordanian Egyptian Fajr for Natural Gas Transmission & Supply 
46- Petro Enviromental Services Co. (PESCO) 
47- Egyptian Linear Alkyl Benzene (ELAB) 
48- Spanish Egyptian Gas Company (SEGAS) 
49- Egyptian Valves Company (EVACO) 
50- Transgas Company 
51- Regional Oil & Gas Technology Transfer Co. (ROGTTC) 
52- Shell Compressed Natural Gas Egypt (Gas Express) 
53- Oil and Gas Skills (OGS) 
54- Suez Safety Outfitters (SSO) 
55- Syrian-Egyptian Company for Oil Services (SEPESCO) 
56- The Egyptian Company for Refrigeration by Natural Gas (Gas Cool) 
57- Sahara Petroleum Services Company S.A.E (SAPESCO) 
58- The Egyptian Styrenics Production Co. 
59- Egyptian Propylene & Polypropylene Company (EPPC) 
60- Sino Tharwa Drilling Company 
61- Petronas 
62- Sonker Bunkering Company 
63- Safy Egypt for Natural Gas Technology Compressed Company 
64- Nile Oil Company 
65- Egyptian Chinese Petroleum Rig Manufacturing Company (EPHH) 
66- Ruhr Pumpen Egypt 
67- Maridive & Oil Services S. A. E. 
68- El Wadi El Gadid For Containers (WGC) 
69- Al Wadi Al Gadid Co. for Mineral Resources and Oil Shale (Wadico) 
70- Al Alameya for Manufacturing Petroleum Equipments (MegaTone) 
71- Egyptian Methanex Methanol Company S.A.E. (EMethanex) 
72- Arabia Gaz Company 
73- Egyptian Nitrogen Products Company (ENPC) 
74- Macoil Egypt 
75- Medcarrier for CNG Transportation 
76- House Gas Co. 
77- Master Gas Co. 
78- Paris Oasis Natural Water Co. 
79- Petroleum Arrows Co. 
80- Pharaonic Gas Company 
81- Cairo Gas Co. 
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82- Tharwa Breda Petroleum Service Co. 
83- International Drilling Material Manufacturing Co. (IDM) 
84- Regions Gas Company (REGAS) 
85- Petroleum Development Co. 
86- Megas 
87- NAT Energy 
88- Shabakat Natural Gas 
89- National Petroleum Company (NPCO) 
90- Egyptian Bahrain Gas Derivatives Company (EBGDCo) 
91- Abu Qir Fertilizers Company 
92- Kuwait Energy 
93- El Sokhna for Refining and Petrochemicals (SRPC) 
94- Kuwait Oil Company 
95- Cairo Gas Co. 
96- Sinai Gas 
97- Hill International Petrol Egypt 
98- Nile Gas  
99- Egyptian Company for Maritime drilling 
100- Sinai Company for Mining and Petroleum Services 
101- TAQA Arabia for Gas 
102- Soprema Egypt Company 
103- Egyptian Petroleum Services Co. (EPSCO ) 
104- Egyptian Company for Gas Services (ECGS) 
105- Egyptian Tantalem Co. 
106- Egyptian Indian for Polyester Co. (EIPET) 
 
Source:  Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies 
 
Multi-National Petroleum Companies 
1- British Petroleum Egypt  (BP) 
2- Shell Egypt 
3- Shell Marketing Egypt 
4- R.W.E DEA Egypt 
5- B.G EGYPT 
6- Eni Ieoc 
7- Dana Gas Oil 
8- Egyptian Petroleum Development Co. Ltd. 
9- Apache Egypt 
10- IPR Group of Companies (Egypt) 
11- IPR 
12- Trident Petroleum Egypt 
13- Vegas Oil & Gas S.A. 
14- Melrose Resources Egypt Company 
15- Trans Globe Energy Corporation 
16- INA - Naftaplin 
17- HBS International Egypt Ltd. 
18- Alliance 
19- Luk Oil 
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20- Pico Energy Group 
21- Baker Hughes E.H.O Ltd. 
22- Schlumberger 
23- Halliburton Energy Services Group 
24- Total Egypt Co. 
25- Libya Oil Egypt 
26- Edison International - Egypt branch 
27- Transocean international Ltd. 
28- Enap Sipetrol  
29- CGG Ardiseis 
30- Exxon Mobil Co. 
31- Gharib Oil Fields 
32- Guide Geoscience Technologies 
33- Massawa Petroleum Company 
34- Gaz de France 
35- Alex Oil S.A. 
36- Egyptian Chinese Drilling Company (ECDC) 
37- Shengli Bohai Drilling (SINODEC) 
38- Hot Shot Egypt 
39- pyramid Drilling Petroleum 
40- Fugro SAE 
41- Perenco 
42- PETZED Investment & Project Management Ltd. 
43- Eagle Marine 
44- Dover Investments Ltd. 
45- Swanco Group 
46- Arabian Oil Company Ltd. (AOC) 
47- Egypt Gas and Oil Services Company S.A.E (EGOSCO) 
48- HESS Egypt  
49- PICO Oil 
50- Kufpec Egypt Limited 
51- Tri- Ocean Energy 
52- Chevron Egypt 
53- Hellenic Petroleum S.A. 
54- Ocean Marine Egypt (S.A.E) 
55- Impresub International L.L.C 
56- El Paso Exploration & Production 
57- Senefro Supplies 
58- Weatherford 
59- NALCO 
60- NAFTO Gaz of Ukraine 
61- CEPSA EGYPT - Oil Exploration and Production 
62- Merlon Petroleum El Fayum Company 
63- PetroSA Egypt 
64- Dana Petroleum 
65- D-Trading Oil & Gas 
66- State Oil Company 
67- OMV EGYPT 
 
Source:  Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies 
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APPENDIX 4 QUESTIONNAIRE 
A Letter for Joint Venture Boards: 
 
Date 
 
Dear Sir : 
The Government of Egypt places a high priority on 
achieving rapid and sustainable growth in Egypt’s 
economy.  Good corporate governance has been 
identified as an influential factor in enabling 
companies to perform at a high level, and is 
therefore also a priority of the government.  
Governance takes on special importance in joint 
ventures between public and private sector 
companies, a common model in the petroleum 
sector both worldwide and in Egypt. 
 
The members of the board constitute the front line 
in the drive to improve governance.  We therefore 
ask for your cooperation in filling out the attached 
questionnaire, which asks for your opinions on the 
functioning of the board on which you serve.  
 
 
The questionnaire does not ask for any 
information on the performance of the company, 
only for your opinions.  Please be assured that all 
answers will be kept in the strictest confidence.  To 
assure this, the questionnaire does not ask for 
your name or the name of the company on whose 
board you serve.  No individual or company-level 
information will be included in the final report. 
 
We appreciate your assistance in collecting this 
information, which will help us to further 
strengthen corporate governance in Egypt and to 
advance our goal of maximizing corporate success 
for the benefit of the citizens of Egypt. 
 
Please complete the questionnaire and submit it 
to [person receiving**] by [**date]. 
 
Regards, 
خيرات 
 
 يديس:زيزعلا  
 ومنلا قيقحتل ةيلاع ةيولوأ رصم ةموكح عضت
  ح دقو يرصملا داصتقلاا يف مادتسملاو عيرسلا  دد
يكمت يف رثؤم لماعك  اكرشلل ةميكحلا ةرادلإا ن
 وه يلاتلابو ،ٍلاع ىوتسم ىلع ءادأ نم  اكرشلا
يولوا نم اضيافرعت ام وا( همكوحلاو ةموكحلا  ا 
راشملا يف ةصاخ ةيمهأب ذختي )ديشرلا مكحلاب عي
من صاخلاو ماعلا عاطقلا  اكرش نيب ةكرتشملا جذو
حنا عيمج يف ءاوس ٍدح ىلع طفنلا عاطِق يف ماع ءا
.رصم ىفو ملاعلا  
 ةلمح يف يماملأا طخلا سلجملا ءاضعأ لكشيو
كنواعت بلطن كلِذلو ةمكوحلا نيسحتءلِم يف م 
لع مككئارأ نع لأسي يذلاو ،قفرملا نايبتسلاا ءادأ ى
.هيف نوكراشت يذلا ةرادلإا سلجملا  
. 
كرشلا ءادأ نع  امولعم يأ نايبتسلاا بلطي لاو ،ة
 عيمج نأ نم نانئمطلاا ىجري اذل .مكئارآ لاا
همات ةيرس يف ىقبتس  اباجلإا.  اذه ديكأتلو
 نع نايبتسلاا بلطي نل نانئمطلااسا وا مكمسا م
ةرادلإا سلجم وضعك اهب مدخت يتلا ةكرشلا 
وأ درفلا ىوتسم ىلع  امولعم يأ جاردأ متي نلو 
.يئاهنلا ريرقتلا يف ةكرشلا 
 ، امولعملا هذه عمج يف مكتدعاسم ردقن نحنو
كرشلا ةمكوح زيزعت ىلع اندعاست فوس يتلاو  ا
حاجن ميظعت يف لثمتملا انفده عفدو رصم يف 
صل  اكرشلارصم يف نينطاوملا حلا . 
لا صخشلا( ىلا هميدقتو نايبتسلاا ءلم ىجري )يقلتم
)خيرات( لبق نم  
 
 ايحتلا،  
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Questionnaire for Members of Joint Venture Boards in the Oil and Gas 
Sector in Egypt 
The following questionnaire has been developed to collect the opinions of board members on the 
operation of the boards of directors of joint venture companies in the petroleum/natural gas sector in 
Egypt.  It is part of a research project on the operation of the boards of state-owned companies in the 
Middle East, which is being conducted under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.   
The purpose of the research is to understand how boards operate.  The information will not be used to 
assess how specific company boards operate or to compare companies to one another.  No information on 
specific companies will be included in the report.  
Please be assured that no information will be included in any reports or published material resulting from 
this research that could identify you, your personal answers, or your company.  To assure confidentiality, 
we are not collecting information on names of individuals or their companies in the questionnaire.  All 
data from individual questionnaires will be held in the strictest confidentiality.  By filling out this 
questionnaire you express your willingness to participate in the study and your understanding that all data 
on individuals’ answers will be kept strictly confidential.  
This questionnaire is closely based on one developed for the Gulf Cooperation Council Board of 
Directors Institute by McKinsey, and is used with the kind permission of the GCCBDI.  It has been 
modified to reduce the number of questions and to better meet the purpose of this study.   
Your participation is very much appreciated.     
1- Please tell us a little about yourself:  
a. Do you have a position in the company other than board membership?                                     Yes/no 
b. Your nationality                                                                                                                    Fill in 
c. Organization you represent on the board                                                          Choice of options 
d. Number of corporate boards you currently serve on, including this board                        Fill in 
e. Number of corporate boards you have ever served on, including this board                        Fill in 
f. BA/BSc field (e.g., engineering, law)                                                                                         Fill in 
2. Board composition and director capabilities 
 The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board.  For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
2.1 Board composition and diversity 
A. The Board has an effective process for nominating and appointing new directors 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board is close to the right size for us to work together effectively 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has among its members the right mix of industrial and functional expertise 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The number of independent directors on the Board is sufficient to ensure the Board's 
independence 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. There is sufficient diversity in opinions and perspectives within the Board 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
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F. Board members’ tenure is adequately long to ensure accountability 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
G. Board members rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the Board 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
2.2 Specific industrial and functional expertise 
A. One or more Board members have substantial expertise on core governance and compliance, 
e.g., nomination, compensation, audit, disclosure 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. One or more Board members have substantial industry/sector expertise, e.g., customer drivers 
and trends, competitive conditions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. One or more Board members have substantial functional expertise in the following areas: 
marketing, finance, risk management, and operations 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
2.3 Capabilities and knowledge development 
A. The Board has a formal development program for new Board members 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. Board members are effective at learning about new ideas or issues that have implications for the 
future of the organization 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Board members keep abreast of broad industry trends individually (e.g., through participation in 
conferences and events) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
3. Director roles and accountabilities 
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
3.1 Director roles and accountabilities 
A. The Board devotes sufficient time to defining each member's role and responsibilities 
B. Board members have a clear understanding of their own specific roles and responsibilities 
regarding the board 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Board members have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other Board 
members 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The Board acts in the best interest of all stakeholders without bias to any particular shareholder 
or stakeholder 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. Board members actively disclose conflicts of interest when they occur in Board discussions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
F. The Board handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from 
discussion or voting) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
3.2 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees 
A. Board committees have clear roles and responsibilities 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. All Board members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has an audit committee with a majority of independent members 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The Board executive committee has a low level of authority and it does not act on behalf of the 
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Board in major decisions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
3.3 Board processes and protocols 
A. The Board has access to adequate, relevant, and timely information 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The materials for the Board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has sufficient access to senior executives 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. Board meetings occur at the right frequency 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. The Board meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
F. The materials prepared for Board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
G. Preparation materials are concise and easy to read and understand 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
4. Delivery on roles of the Board 
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
4.1 Strategy 
A. Board members are sufficiently involved in strategy development 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. Board members spend enough time discussing strategy issues 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Board members all agree on the challenges and opportunities the organization is facing 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The Board has a clear strategy to respond to these challenges and opportunities 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. All Board members agree that the Board has the right strategy 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
F. The Board has a robust strategy implementation plan with clear accountabilities and follow up 
process 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
4.2 Performance management 
A. The Board is effectively involved in managing business performance 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing performance management topics 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has a real understanding of how well the organization is performing 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The Board is tracking a set of performance indicators (e.g., ROE, sales, profit) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. The Board is tracking a set of health indicators (e.g., employees attrition rate, customer 
satisfaction, new products share of revenue) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
F. The Board discusses performance and health indicators frequently with senior management, 
focusing on improvement opportunities 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
G. The Board rigorously follows up on identified improvement actions 
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( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
4.3 Attitudes toward company performance issues 
A. It is appropriate to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The company should consult with the communities where it operates on issues that would affect 
them 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The company should act to minimize possible negative impacts on the community, even if there 
is no legal requirement to do so 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The company should not enter into risky projects even if they might generate a high rate of 
profit 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. All shareholders, including the public, have a right to know the details on the company's 
financial performance 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
F. The company should give preference to local suppliers, even if they are more expensive or offer 
a lower quality 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
G. The company should disclose full information on its environmental performance to the public 
and the community 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
5. Delivery on roles of the Board 
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
5.1 Risk management 
A. The Board is effectively involved in setting the risk appetite of the company 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing risk management issues 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has a clear visibility on the top-5 risks facing the company 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. A full assessment is conducted of the impact of these risks on company financials (cash flow) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. The Board spends sufficient time to ensure integrity of companies accounting and financial 
reporting systems 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
5.2 Talent management 
A. The Board is effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation, 
evaluation, development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management 
team) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing talent management issues 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board has a documented process of succession plans for all critical positions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
6. Effective dynamics 
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
6.1 Preparation and participation 
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A. All Board members prepare well for Board meetings 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. All Board members are engaged in Board discussions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Board members are always clear on the purpose of their discussions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. Board members are open and honest with each other during their discussions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
E. The Board uses the right type, quality, and quantity of information to support discussions (e.g., 
appropriate balance between presentations and discussions) 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
6.2 Challenge and conflict 
A. The Board encourages and values discussion of different options and viewpoints 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board members are comfortable challenging each other to ensure the Board arrives at the 
best outcome 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board is able to reach closure on difficult decisions 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. Disagreements among Board members are resolved constructively and without personal 
animosity 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
6.3 Effective dynamics 
A. The Board's approach to decision making is transparent, fair, and efficient 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The chairman facilitates Board decision making rather than making decisions on behalf of the 
Board ( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Every discussion ends with a clear set of next steps: who will do what, by when 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
6.4 Interaction with senior management 
A. The Board and senior management team have the right frequency of meetings together 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. Meetings between the Board and senior management team provide a forum for open and honest 
discussion ( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. Board members and senior management constructively challenge each other's ideas in Board 
meetings ( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. There is a culture of trust and respect between Board members and senior management 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
 
7. Overall Board effectiveness and renewal 
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For 
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement. 
7.1 Board evaluation 
A. The effectiveness of Board meetings is discussed afterwards 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board evaluates individual directors on their performance at least annually 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board evaluates its collective performance as a team at least annually 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
7.2 Board renewal 
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A. The Board takes the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges 
and opportunities for improvement are 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
B. The Board is flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
C. The Board is good at putting an end to things that no longer merit time or effort 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
D. The Board is open to new ways of doing things 
( ) Strongly Agree  ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree 
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  استبيان لأعضاء مجالس الشركات المشتركة في قطاع النفط والغاز في مصر:
الغاز الطبيعي المشتركة في قطاع البترول ولقد تم تطوير الاستبيان التالي لجمع أراء اعضاء المجلس عن عمل مجالس إدارا  الشركا  
ح  في مصر وهو جزء من مشروح بحثي عن عمل مجالس إدارا  الشركا  المملوكة للدولة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط والتي تجرى ت
 .رعاية منظمة التعاون والتنمية الاقتصادية
ا  أو ن هذه المعلوما  لن ت ستخدم لتقييم عمل مجالس الإداروالغرض من هذا البحث هو أن نفهم كيف تعمل مجالس الإدارا  مع العلم أ
 .لمقارنة الشركا  بعضها ببعض ولن يتم إدراج أي معلوما  عن شركا  محددة في هذا التقرير
وعلى ليكم برجاء الاطمئنان بأنه لن يتم تضمين أي معلوما  في أية تقارير او مادة منشورة ناجمة عن هذا البحث الذي يمكن التعرف ع
ان كما أنه سيتم أجابتكم الشخصية أو شركتكم. ولضمان السرية نحن لا نقوم بجمع معلوما  عن أسماء الأفراد أو شركاتهم في هذا الاستبي
اسة وفهمكم أن التعامل مع كافة البيانا  بسرية تامة، وعن طريق ملء هذا الاستبيان يمكنكم التعبير عن استعدادكم للمشاركة في الدر
 . البيانا  الخاصة بإجاباتكم ستحاط بسرية تامةجميع 
تخدم بإذن ودي ويستند هذا على أحد الاستبيانا  الذي تم تطويره لصالح مجلس ادارة مجلس التعاون الخليجي من قبل معهد مكينزى وي س
 . هذه الدراسة من مجلس إدارة مجلس التعاون الخليجي حيث تم تعديله للحد من عدد الأسئلة ولتحسين تلبية الغرض من
 مشاركاتكم موضع تقدير كبير     
 تحياتي       
 الباحث
  :يرجى التحدث عن أنفسكم قليلا
  ( هل تشغل وظيفة في الشركة علاوة على عضويتكم في مجلس الإدارة؟نعم  /لا   ) 
 الجنسية  
 الهيئة التي تمثلها في المجلس
  في ذلك مجلس الإدارة هذا عدد مجالس إدارات الشركات التي تعمل بها حاليا بما
 عدد مجالس إدارات الشركات التي عملت بها بما في ذلك مجلس الإدارة هذا
  الخ ---قانون-المؤهل العلمي (على سبيل المثال هندسة (
 تشكيل المجلس وقدرات العضو
الاتفاق او  لإشارة إلى مستوى منصمم  الأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك عن فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا  التالية يرجى ا
 الاختلاف
 تشكيل المجلس والتنوع
 للمجلس فعالية لترشيح وتعيين أعضاء جدد
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 المجلس قريب من الوضع الحقيقي لنا للعمل معا ًبشكل فعال
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 للمجلس المزيج المناسب من الخبرة الصناعية والفنية بين أعضائه
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 241
 
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 عدد المديرين المستقلين في المجلس يكفي لضمان استقلالية المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
  أوافق () لا
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 هناك ما يكفي من التنوع في الآراء ووجها  النظر داخل المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 مدة عضوية المجلس طويلة على نحو كاف لضمان المساءلة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يتناوب أعضاء المجلس بمعدل كاٍف تسمح بانضمام مواهب جديدة إلى المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 الخبرة الصناعية والفنية النوعية
التعويض سبيل المثال الترشيح و واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة كبيرة عن الحكومة والامتثال للوائح وقوانين على
 والمراجعة وكشف الأمور
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
د كبيره من واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة كبيرة في القطاع او الصناعة، على سبيل المثال لديه خبره في اجتذاب اعدا
  المناخ التنافسي الموجودالعملاء او مواكبه 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة فنية كبيرة في المجالا  الأتية: التسويق والمالية وإدارة المخاطر والعمليا 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
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 تطوير القدرات والمعرفة
 المجلس لدية برنامج تنمية رسمي لأعضاء مجلس إدارة جدد
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 للمجلس فعالية في التعرف على أفكار جديدة أو قضايا لها آثار على مستقبل المنظمة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
  على الحياد() 
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  والأحداث يواكب أعضاء المجلس الاتجاها  الصناعية المتنوعة بشكل فردى (على سبيل المثال من خلال المشاركة في المؤتمرا  (
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 أدوار ومحاسبات عضو المجلس
  تفاق أو الاختلافالأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس لكل من العبارا  التالية يرجى الإشارة إلى مستوى الاص مم  
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  دوار ومحاسبات عضو المجلسأ
 يكرس المجلس وقتا ًكافيا ًلتحديد دور ومسئوليا  كل عضو
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى أعضاء المجلس فهم واضح لأدواهم ومسئولياتهم النوعية تجاه المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى أعضاء المجلس فهم واضح لأدوار ومسئوليا  جميع أعضاء المجلس الآخرين
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يعمل المجلس من أجل تحقيق أفضل مصلحة لكافة الأطراف المشاركة دون التحيز إلى أي مساهم خاص أو أي طرف مشارك
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يكشف أعضاء المجلس بفاعلية تضارب المصالح عندما تحدث في مناقشا  المجلس
  أوافق بشده() 
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  وي يتعامل المجلس مع تضارب المصالح بشكل مناسب (على سبيل المثال: استبعاد العضو المنازع من المناقشة أو التص (
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  المجلسأدوار ومسئوليات لجان 
 لدى لجان المجلس أدوار ومسئوليا  واضحة  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 جميع أعضاء المجلس على دراية تامة لأدوار ومسئوليا  لجان المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  مراجعه يشغلها أغلبية من الأعضاء المستقلينلدى المجلس لجنة 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
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 )(لا أوافق بشده
 الجنة التنفيذية للمجلس لديها مستوى منخفض من السلطة ولا تنيب عن المجلس في القرارا  الرئيسية
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 أعمال وبروتوكولات المجلس
 لدى المجلس حق الوصول إلى المعلوما  الكافية ذا  الصلة وفي الوق  المناسب
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يتم إرسال مواد (مذكرا ) اجتماع المجلس قبل عقد الاجتماع
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
  حياد() على ال
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس حق الوصول الكافي لكبار المسئولين التنفيذيين
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 تعقد اجتماعا  مجلس الإدارة بمعدل مناسب
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يعطى جدول أعمال المجلس الأولوية لمناقشة الموضوعا  الهامة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 تنصب المواد (المذكرا ) المعدة للمجلس بفاعلية على الموضوعا  المخصصة للمناقشة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 المواد (المذكرا )المعدة مختصرة وسهلة القراءة والفهم
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 تسليم أدوار المجلس
الاتفاق أو من  ص مم  الأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظركم في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا  التالية يرجى الإشارة إلى مستوى
 الاختلاف
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 الاستراتيجية
 يشارك أعضاء المجلس بما فيه الكفاية في تنمية الاستراتيجية
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقضى أعضاء المجلس وقتا ًكافيا ًلمناقشة القضايا الاستراتيجية
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
  لا أوافق() 
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  يتفق جميع أعضاء المجلس على التحديا  التي تواجهها المنظمة وايضا الفرص التي تسنح لها  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس استراتيجية واضحة للرد على تلك التحديا  والفرص
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 جميع أعضاء المجلس متفقون على أن لدى المجلس استراتيجية صحيحة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس خطة تنفيذيه استراتيجية قوية تتسم بعملية مساءلة ومتابعه واضحة
 () أوافق بشده
  أوافق() 
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
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 إدارة الأداء
 يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في إدارة تقييم أداء الأعمال
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقضى المجلس وقتا  كافيا ًلمناقشة موضوعا  إدارة الأداء
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس فهم حقيقي لمدى عمل المنظمة بشكل سليم وناجح
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  حالمبيعا  او الأربايتبع المجلس مجموعة من مؤشرا  الأداء (على سبيل المثال مؤشرا  العائد على حقوق المساهمين او  (
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
ء او حصة يتبع المجلس مجموعة من المؤشرا  الصحية (على سبيل المثال: مؤشرا  معدل ترك الموظفين لوظائفهم او رضا العملا
 المنتجا  الجديدة من الربح (
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
  الحياد() على 
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يناقش المجلس الأداء والمؤشرا  الصحية في كثير من الأحيان مع الإدارة العليا مع التركيز على فرص التحسين
 يتابع المجلس بدقة أعمال التحسين المحددة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
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  قضايا أداء الشركةاتجاهات نحو 
 من المناسب الغاء الوظائف إذا كان هذا ضروريا لزيادة ربحية الشركة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 ينبغي للشركة أن تتشاور مع المجتمع حيث أن الشركة تعمل على القضايا التي من شأنها أن تؤثر عليهم  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 ينبغي للشركة أن تعمل على تقليل الأثار السلبية المحتملة على المجتمع حتى في عدم وجود أي مطلب قانونيا لذلك
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  مخاطر حتى لو كان  قد تولد نسبة عالية من الأرباح ينبغي للشركة ألا تدخل في مشروعا  ذا 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 جميع المساهمين بما في ذلك الجمهور لهم الحق في معرفة تفاصيل الأداء المالي للشركة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 ينبغي للشركة أن تعطى الأولوية للموردين المحليين حتى إذا كانوا أغلى أو أقل جودة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يجب على الشركة الإفصاح عن معلوما  كاملة عن أدائها البيئي للجمهور والمجتمع
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
  الحياد() على 
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 تسليم أدوار المجلس
الاتفاق أو  صمم  الأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا  التالية، يرجى الإشارة إلى مستوى
 الاختلاف
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 إدارة المخاطر
 يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في تحديد رغبة الشركة في خوض أي مخاطرة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
  )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقضى المجلس وقتا ًكافيا ًلمناقشة قضايا ًإدارة المخاطر
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس رؤية واضحة لأعلى خمس مخاطر تواجه الشركة
 () أوافق بشده
  أوافق() 
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 إجراء تقييم كامل على أثر تلك المخاطر على ماليا  الشركة (التدفق النقدي
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 المجلس يقضى وقتا ًكافيا  لضمان سلامة نظم التقارير المحاسبية والمالية
  وافق بشده() أ
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 إدارة المواهب
خطيط لخلافة يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في إدارة المواهب (على سبيل المثال: الاختيار او التعويض او التقييم او التنمية او الت
 وظائف الإدارة العليا الهامة)
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
  الحياد() على 
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقضى المجلس وقتا ًكافيا ًلمناقشة قضايا ًإدارة المواهب
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس عملية موثقة لخطط الخلافة لجميع المناصب الهامة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
  أوافق() لا 
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 الديناميكية الفعالة
ن الاتفاق أو صمم  الأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا  التالية يرجى الإشارة إلى مستوى م
 الاختلاف
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 الإعداد والمشاركة
 هناك إعداد جيد لاجتماعا  مجلس الإدارة من قبل جميع أعضاء المجلس
  أوافق بشده() 
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يشارك جميع أعضاء المجلس في مناقشا  المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 أعضاء المجلس على وضوح دائم عن الغرض من مناقشاتهم  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
  )(لا أوافق بشده
 أعضاء المجلس لديهم الصراحة والنزاهة مع بعضهم البعض أثناء المناقشة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
ن ما هو مطروح لمناسب بييستخدم المجلس النوع والكيف والكم الصحيح من المعلوما  لدعم المناقشا  (على سبيل المثال: التوازن ا
 ومناقشاته)
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 التحدي والصراع
 يشجع المجلس ويقيم مناقشة الخيارا  ووجها  النظر المختلفة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  مسالم مع بعضهم البعض لضمان وصول المجلس الى أفضل النتائج أعضاء المجلس في تحدى
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يملك المجلس المقدرة على الوصول الى النقطة الفاصلة عند القرارا  الصعبة
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يتم حل الخلافا  بين أعضاء المجلس بطريقة بناءة وبدون عداء شخصي
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
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 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 الديناميكية الفعالة
 يتسم نهج المجلس في اتخاذ القرارا  بالشفافية والعدالة والكفاءة  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
  أوافق() لا 
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقدم رئيس المجلس التسهيلا  للمجلس لصنع القرار بدلا ًمن صنع القرارا  نيابة عن المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 ينتهي كل نقاش بمجموعة واضحة من الخطوا  التالية: من سيفعل ماذا ومتى
 () أوافق بشده
  وافق() أ
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 التفاعل مع الإدارة العليا
 يجتمع مجلس الإدارة وفريق الإدارة العليا بمعدل مناسب معاً   
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  منتدى للمناقشة الحرة والنزيهةتوفر الاجتماعا  بين مجلس الإدارة وفريق الإدارة العليا 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقوم أعضاء المجلس والإدارة العليا بالتحدي البناء لأفكار بعضهم البعض في اجتماعا  المجلس
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  ثقافة الثقة والاحترام بين أعضاء المجلس والإدارة العلياهناك    
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 الفعالية والتجديد الشامل للمجلس
من الاتفاق أو  صمم  الأسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظركم في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا  التالية يرجى الإشارة إلى مستوى
 الاختلاف
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 تقييم المجلس
 يتم مناقشة فعالية اجتماعا  المجلس فيما بعد  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يتم تقييم المجلس لأداء أعضاءه منفردين على الأقل سنوياً 
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 يقوم المجلس بتقييم أدائهم الجماعي كفريق على الأقل سنويا  
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 تحديث مجلس الإدارة
 يأخذ المجلس الوق  للرجوع خطوة إلى الوراء والتفكير في مدى فعاليته والتحديا  والفرص المتاحة للتحسين
  أوافق بشده ()
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 لدى المجلس المرونة الكافية لإعادة تحديد الأولويا  عندما يتطلب الموقف ذلك
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
  الوق  أو الجهد لدى المجلس الصلاحية في وضع حد للأشياء التي لم تعد تستحق
 () أوافق بشده
 () أوافق
 () على الحياد
 () لا أوافق
 )(لا أوافق بشده
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
